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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a response to Bennett's (1977)
call for a theoretical framework capable of integrating
existing theories of mass belief systems.

The theory

offered here is built on two important discoveries in this
body of research: the importance of simplifying heuristics
and the hierarchical structure of belief systems.
Recognizing that heuristics are described in a narrative
form, the general importance of narrative for political
cognition is suggested and explored.

Of particular

importance is the possibility that hierarchical belief
systems are grounded in core narratives or myths.

After

demonstrating the theoretical links between myth and belief
system, a way of conceptualizing a narrative view of
political cognition is developed.

This step in the

dissertation argues that the political belief system is
best conceived of as a self-organized system, and that
narrative functions as a form/process which provides the
organizing principle for the system.

Next the relationship

between this and previous theories of belief systems is
explored.

Finally, interviews with a small number of

respondents are examined for indications of the existence
and function of myths and other narratives within political
beliefs.

iv

INTRODUCTION

In order to be clear on the object of study, the first
task is to give some indication of the location of this
dissertation within the discipline of political science.
The line of inquiry to which it attempts to add is usually
labeled public opinion research.

Like most previous public

opinion research, the dissertation will examine popular as
opposed to elite "behavior."

This means the focus will not

be any specific governmental institution, but society at
large. Furthermore, as implied by the label for this type
of research, the phenomena under consideration relates to
the opinions rather than the actions of this public.
A subset of the public opinion literature looks for an
organizational framework for these attitudes.

In other

words, the political scientist looks for some internal
coherence to opinions on various issues.
beliefs is referred to as a belief system.

A coherent set of
According to

Converse, a belief system is "a configuration of ideas and
attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some
form of constraint or functional interdependence"
207).

(1964,

The ideas and attitudes which are most often

examined are political opinions, usually policy opinions.
The theoretical work in this research boils down to an
effort to explain the constraint or functional
interdependence.

As will be introduced presently and
1
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discussed in detail in succeeding chapters, several
explanations have been proposed.
It is the primary contention of this dissertation that
the coherence of the belief systems of most individuals is
grounded in a myth of human social interactions.

Before

proceeding any further, however, it is important to clarify
what is meant by the term myth.

The term is not often used

in political science, and when it is, it usually indicates
a lie, some sort of falsehood perpetrated to achieve
political ends.

In anthropology, however, myth is seen as

something quite different.

In the context of the ensuing

discussion of political belief systems, the term myth
refers to foundational narratives which describe the nature
of social relationships and the individual's place within
those relationships.

More generally, narrative or story

indicates any cognitive vignette portraying characters and
their actions.
The need for fundamental theoretical work on belief
systems is evident in the fragmented nature of past
research.

The approach of Converse (e.g. 1964) and many

others has been to begin with the assumption that
individuals are socialized into a particular belief system.
Thus it was logical for these investigators to speak of a
"mass belief system" believing as they did that most
citizens would be socialized into one of a very small
number (usually two) of existing belief systems.

Partially
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as a consequence of Converse's own findings, this body of
research has fractured into several lines of inquiry.

Some

of these maintain the search for sociological origins of
belief systems and political opinions generally.

Others

have abandoned this tack of investigation and have focussed
on individual psychological characteristics: emotional
attachments to social groups, internal cognitive
structures, etc.

Until very recently, most of these

approaches existed as independent research projects,
offering meaningful, but speaking theoretically or
empirically, only partial explanations of the phenomena
(Bennett 1977) .
The first major step in presenting the dissertation
will be a critical review of this literature.

Analysis of

the various approaches indicates that all of them display
both strengths and weaknesses.

None of them is definitive,

but neither can any be completely rejected.

Furthermore,

in order to develop as clear a picture as possible of what
is known, the public opinion literature considered in this
dissertation will not be limited to research explicitly
exploring systems of political belief.

In an effort to

achieve clarity of analysis, much investigation of people's
political opinions examines only a single opinion or set of
similar opinions.

These projects are fruitful sources of

theory and discovery, and their results easily applied to
belief systems as a whole.

The discussion of such research
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presented herein will spell out exactly what is being
explained, and how the ideas and findings are important to
the study of belief systems.
The key to broadening an understanding of belief
systems is the integration of

previous theories.

Bennett

(1977) describes the belief system literature as being
replete with anomalies in the Kuhnian sense.

He suggests

that there are several possible outcomes to this situation,
the most desirable of which is
possible if a general, integrative, theory of
mass beliefs could be constructed through the
systematic identification and evaluation of the
epistemological assumptions underlying disputed
concepts and findings. The major advantage of
this outcome would be the production of a
systematically articulated theory, the
assumptions of which were well documented as a
result of the process of integrating divergent
viewpoints (473).
This is the target at which the present dissertation is
aimed.
Movement toward this mark requires development of a
theory and then demonstration of its integrative
capability.

The theory of political belief to be proposed

in this dissertation is derived from previous research.

It

begins with what I believe to be a paradigmatic example of
policy reasoning.

This example is the desert heuristic as

set forth by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991).
According to these researchers:
A perception that some person or group is in need
gives rise to a search for causation (why does
the need exist?).
In turn, the causal

conclusions that people reach have important
implications for their reactions to the needy
individual or group...Did the need arise as a
result of some internal characteristic of the
actor or some aspect of the external environment?
(72)
Answers to such questions lead to emotional responses to
the situation

which, in turn, imply

conclusions aboutthe

proper response which the government

should take (72-73) .

The first step in moving beyond this description of
policy evaluation is to name its general form; I
chosen the name narrative due to its
characters and plot.

have

integration of

The majority of this dissertation is

concerned with exploring and evaluating the implications of
applying the name narrative to this general form of
political reasoning.
Chapter two begins by combining this observation with
the fairly well supported proposition that belief systems
are hierarchical in structure.

This leads to speculation

about the importance of core narratives.

And the social

science concept most similar to an idea of core narrative
is myth.

The first challenge in making the case that

political beliefs are grounded in myths is demonstrating
that myth is theoretically relevant to belief system.
Chapter two will present the theoretical argument for the
compatibility of the concepts myth and belief system.

The

importance of myths to people's lives generally and the
extensive co-incidence between the nature and function of
myth and the qualities of belief system in need of

explanation are justifications for further analysis of this
relationship.
This focus on myths and narratives will bring to light
one fundamental, epistemological weakness in nearly all of
the belief system literature, namely the physicality of its
description of political cognition.

Following in a

Newtonian scientific tradition, exploration of belief
systems has incorporated such concepts as ideological
"yardsticks", schematic "scaffolding" and "causal chains of
reasoning."

As it will be described at the end of chapter

two, though, a myth based belief system would be a much
less structured affair.

However, even in the natural

world, systems have been discovered whose dynamics are far
more complex than the simple, linear systems described by
Newton.

These systems have been described as "self-

organized systems"

(Scott, 1989).

Chapter three will begin with a discussion of self
organized systems and present evidence that the political
belief system is a good example of them.

The subsequent

discussion will demonstrate that viewing belief systems as
self-organized gives further credence to the suggestion
that myths, and narratives more generally, are fundamental
aspects of political thinking.

This reconceptualization,

however, shifts the focus of investigative effort.

There

is reason to be circumspect in making predictions about
changes in self-organized belief systems; attention should

be directed towards an organizational process.

Stated

succinctly, the conclusion from this discussion is that the
individual belief system is best understood as being
neither linked by causal/logic chains of reasoning, nor as
purely random, but rather as exhibiting an order centered
on evolving narratives and related processes.

At the

collective level, myths, those important narratives shared
by peoples with common experiences, are the common threads
connecting the mass belief system.
Having developed a theory of myth based belief
systems, the next chapter of the dissertation will proceed
along lines suggested by Bennett (1977).

That is, it will

attempt to demonstrate that this theory integrates other
explanations of belief systems.

This step requires a

careful reconsideration of the arguments and the empirical
findings of the earlier studies.

To the extent that this

theory is an integration of others, it must capture the
strengths and avoid the theoretical limitations of research
grounded in ideology, core values, schema, etc.
The final substantive chapter of this dissertation
will consist of a brief glimpse of the real world as it is
illuminated by the theory of myth based belief systems.
More specifically, I will collect and analyze data on the
political beliefs of a small number of college students.
Of interest will be the presence of narratives in their
policy reasoning, shared core narratives, and rational

coherence of the whole system despite superficial
differences between respondents in policy opinions.
These, then, are the issues which will be discussed in
this dissertation: that cognition in the belief system is
self-organized, consequently it is more meaningful to speak
of an organizing process rather than a fixed organizational
structure; at the individual level there is reason to
believe that narrative is an important element of this
process; and that myths are shared narratives which play a
powerful role in the integration of individual belief
systems and form the foundation for mass belief systems.
Though these points are important additions to the
study of political cognition, this project will raise many
more questions than it answers.

An entirely new approach

to the study of the phenomena is in fact being suggested;
an approach which will have only rudimentary beginnings
here.

Nevertheless, these ideas do offer answers to some

of the persistent questions which have plagued this sub
field: Why does a separate belief system continue to exist
for black Americans?
elite belief systems?
relate to change?

Why is ideology only relevant to
How do political culture and schema

How do religious beliefs interact with

political belief systems?

Answers to such questions will

be discussed when they are reconsidered from the vantage
point of a theory of myth based belief systems.

A few

interesting questions raised by the dissertation, as well
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as suggestions for future exploration, will be included in
the conclusion.

CHAPTER I
LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature to be presented here has been reviewed
and critiqued many times.

Most recently Sniderman, Brody,

and Tetlock (1991) have provided an excellent, general
summary of much of it.

The present analysis of the

research on belief systems has a very specific goal,
however.

The intent here is to establish a foundation on

which an integrated theory might be built.

This requires a

demonstration that the various theoretical approaches to
the topic are not mutually exclusive; that there are points
of overlap between the concepts of ideology, core values,
social groups, etc.

The primary purpose of this literature

review, therefore, is to make explicit these points of
common ground.

Doing so should produce a clearer picture

of the elements which must be included in an integrated
theory.
This review will proceed by examination of major,
representative pieces within each of the major theoretical
frameworks.

First to be considered will be the

sociological explanations: ideology and political culture.
The latter research does not normally directly treat the
belief system phenomena.

Nevertheless, it has important

implications for understanding policy reasoning.
Discussion of the more individual oriented, psychological
approaches will follow.

Included here will be
10
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presentations of the following concepts: core values,
social group identity, attribution theory, and schemas.

In 1964, Converse set the tone and the parameters for much
of the debate on the relationship between ideology and
belief systems which was to follow.

In this article, he

lays out a theoretical framework depicting the ideological
belief system, and then demonstrates empirically that this
depiction does not describe the political beliefs of the
vast majority of Americans.

The theoretical and the

empirical elements of Converse's work have both been
foundations for subsequent research; consequently, both
must be considered in some detail.
One important aspect of Converse's theory of belief
systems is his definition of the concept.

Quoted above, it

has remained the standard expression of the phenomena
regardless of the theoretical approach to its study.
Converse also lays out the classic statement of the
theoretical link between the individual belief system,
which he has defined, and the concept of mass belief
system.

According to Converse,

"a minuscule proportion of

any population" performs the necessary "act of creative
synthesis," linking various ideas together "into apparently
logical wholes that are credible to large numbers of
people"

(211).

as ideologies.

These artificial "packages" are referred to
The next step required in the construction
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of a mass belief system is the distribution of these
packages to the masses.

These super-elites present the

ideas and their logical constraint to others through such
rhetorical forms as

"'if you believe this, then you will

also believe that, for it follows in such and such ways'"
(211).

As the masses accept these arguments, political

thinking within a nation becomes coherent.

Incoherence in

the structure of collective opinion results from the
failure to communicate ideas and logic (212-14).
A third element of Converse's theory which has been
very important in the belief system literature is the
suggestion that in the case of contemporary Western
politics, the functioning ideology is the liberalconservative continuum (214) .

The argument that this

continuum should be the ideological source of belief system
constraint is grounded in its prevalence among political
elites of all types, and its rational efficiency or
"economy"

(214-15).

Though Converse recognizes that "the

liberal-conservative continuum is a rather elegant, highorder abstraction, and [that] such abstractions are not
typical conceptual tools for the 'man on the street,'"

he

nevertheless maintains it as the primary lens through which
he examines belief systems.
Empirically, Converse begins with analysis of a set of
open ended questions.

From this data he establishes a

taxonomy referred to as levels of conceptualization.

The
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five levels range from those who seem to use and understand
ideological labels in their policy opinions to those who
have few or no policy opinions at all.

Converse finds that

these levels are closely related to education and political
information.

Further empirical analysis confirms that this

stratification of the respondents captures important
differences between people's belief systems.

Correlations

between pairs of opinions indicate that elite thinking is
more constrained than non-elites (227-31).

Also,

longitudinal analysis reveals greater temporal stability in
the opinions of elites (238-45).
One further empirical finding in this research is
worth noting at this point.

For roughly half of the survey

respondents, by far the largest single level, social groups
are an essential element in its policy opinions.

As will

be discussed below, this finding is the inspiration for
another line of inquiry into the structure of public
opinion.
Converse concludes that the American electorate is not
ideologically constrained, but is comprised of a collection
of disparate "issue publics."

These issue publics differ

in the policies which interest them: "different
controversies excite different people to the point of real
opinion formation"

(246).

"A realistic picture of

political belief systems in the mass public, then, is not
one that omits issues and policy demands completely nor one
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that presumes widespread ideological coherence; it is
rather one that captures with some fidelity the
fragmentation, narrowness, and diversity of these demands"
(247).

Converse expresses a belief that no theoretical

explanation of this picture, which would be both powerful
and parsimonious, is possible.
At about the time Converse's comments on the
disorganization of public opinion were being published, an
increase in organization was apparently taking place.

Nie

and Anderson (1974) find that between 1960 and 1964 there
was a dramatic increase in the ideological consistency of
the American population.

Following Converse, they measure

ideological consistency as correlations between pairs of
issue positions.

As an explanation of the changes, Nie and

Anderson suggest that politics had become more salient in
people's lives: "we argue that the political events of the
last decade [the 1960s] and the crisis atmosphere which has
attended them, have caused citizens to perceive politics as
increasingly central to their lives"

(571).

Consequently,

they propose, people are under increasing psychological
pressure to purge the "inconsistencies" from their
reasoning.

Or, in language Converse might have used, the

number of issue publics collapses around the ideological
reasoning of elites because people are paying more
attention to information from this source.

Measuring

salience with an inquiry into attention the respondent pays

15
to elections, Nie and Anderson do find a relationship
between this factor and ideological consistency (571-574) .
An alternative explanation for the post 1960 increase
in ideological consistency is proffered by Carmines and
Stimson (1982).

Converse observed that there were

variations in the centrality of issues within a belief
system (19 64, 2 08).

Carmines and Stimson suggest that

beginning in the early 1960s,
as the symbolic, emotionally charged issues of
race took on a clear partisan complexion, they
simultaneously moved to the center of the
political belief systems.
In other words the
partisan evolution of race lead to an increase in
ideological constraint as mass responses to
racial issues became aligned with attitudes
toward other political issues (6).
That is, the number of issue publics collapsed not because
politics in general became more salient but because they
found a common center, a center on which there was
increasingly clear elite leadership.
Factor analysis of issue positions controlling for
race provides empirical evidence that racial concerns
became central to the consistency of belief systems of
those of higher cognitive ability (Carmines and Stimson
1982, 9-17).

In order to explain this rather rapid change,

however, Carmines and Stimson must alter Converse's (1964)
sociological explanation of attitude consistency.

They

argue that the public opinion elites who supply structure
to public belief systems are specific candidates for
elected office at a given time.

Thus belief systems are
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not learned over the course of a lifetime, but during those
brief periods when politics brings itself to the forefront
of people's awareness (Carmines and Stimson 1982, 19-20).
It is important to note that the Carmines and Stimson
and the Nie and Anderson explanations of increase in
attitude constraint are not mutually exclusive.

The rise

of racial questions in public policy discourse could have
been responsible for the increasing salience of politics.
It is also important to note that in these and many other
investigations, there remains a large segment of the
population for whom no attitude consistency is evident.
There may, however, be problems with the initial
discovery on which these two studies are based, that
ideological consistency increased in the early 1960s.
Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1978) examine changes in
National Election Study (NES) question wording over this
time period.

Testing two question formats on two samples

of the same population at the same time, these
investigators find differences in magnitude of ideological
consistency between the two samples comparable to those
discussed above (see also Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick
1978) .
Other researchers have called into question
theoretical aspects of the ideological approach to the
study of belief systems.

Achen (1975) questions the

validity of the response categories.

Specifically he
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suggests that Converse and others have put too much stock
in the qualifier "strongly."

His evidence demonstrates

that interpretations of this term are time bound and random
even for elites.

This discovery brings into question

Converse's finding that elite attitudes are more stable
than those of non-elites.
In a more recent study, Fleishman (1986) finds no
support for the salience hypothesis.

Despite an

increasingly conservative leadership, there is no
corresponding increase in the ideology of the masses.

He

finds a decline, in fact, in the number of people who
identify themselves as liberal or conservative (536-37).
Responding to these latter findings, subsequent
research has suggested other variations on the Converse
theme.

Lilie (1986) has suggested a more complex, two

dimensional ideological structure to public opinion.
Wittkopf (1986, 1987) and Holsti and Rosenau (1988) have
discovered evidence of a similar structure for opinions on
foreign policy issues.

Still others have demonstrated

that, for many, the ideological labels are symbolic terms
with little or no issue content (Levitin and Miller 1979;
Conover and Feldman 1981).
This line of inquiry has brought us to a point at
which "we know more about how people do not think about
politics than about how they do"

(Feldman 1988, 416).

circumstance is partially a result of theoretical

This
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limitations in Converse's notions of ideological belief
systems.

According to Converse, the absence of ideological

uniformity is a product of breakdown in the dissemination
of information from elites to masses.

By contrast, other

commentators on ideology point out that variations in
historical

(e.g., Halpern 1961), material (e.g. Lasswell

and Kaplan 1950), and other factors may contribute to
variations in ideology.

If these latter are more accurate,

we should expect a great deal of ideological pluralism in
the United States.
Adding credence to the suggestion that we should
expect to find ideological variations within the American
population is Grafstein's (1990) argument that different
ideologies may be equally rational.

Grafstein suggests

that what appear to us as irrational belief systems may in
fact be perfectly rational conclusions derived from
different premisses or "conceptual schemes:"
given the existence of differing conceptual
schemes, there is no reason to assume that fully
rational individuals-with rationality defined our
way-wili converge to the same beliefs once they
are presented with a lot of information or
evidence. Chances are, there will always be the
potential for divergent conclusions (13).
This in fact is consistent with Converse's own recognition
that the liberal-conservative continuum is an artificial
construct and is only one way to rationally constrain
public issues.

19
This is an important point for the social scientist
who studies belief systems to keep in mind when
interpreting survey data.

The fact that rational belief

systems do not appear to the researcher is not conclusive
evidence that rational belief systems do not exist.

For

example, correlations between pairs of issue positions, or
groups of issue positions through factor analysis, are
tests of the degree to which groups of people think like
each other.

Nothing can be concluded from such tests about

the rational coherence of any individual's belief system
(Brown 197 0).
Despite these theoretical and empirical limitations on
the search for ideologically constrained belief systems,
two important discoveries have survived scrutiny.

First

there is a substantial portion of the population which has
almost no opinions on contemporary political issues.

We

must recognize, then, that any discussion of mass belief
systems excludes this group.

Second, opinions of elites do

seem to be somewhat constrained along the liberalconservative continuum.

Thus this measuring stick has some

significance and must be included in any attempt to develop
a more complete explanation.

Even for the most politically

astute segment of the population, however, correlations
between pairs of issues never approach unity; there remains
a great deal of unexplained variance in their belief
systems.
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A somewhat more abstract approach to the study of the
sociological origins of public opinion is taken by those
who employ the concept of political culture.

Devine (1972)

provides an excellent treatment of the traditional
understanding of political culture.

At its core, Devine

argues, a political culture is a value system.

Though it

is not universal, it is the value system held by the
majority of the members of a political system.

This value

system is historical, i.e. transferred from generation to
generation, and is comprised of four sub-systems: identity,
which is psychological attachment to the political system
as a whole and its members; rules, which are political
norms of action, a constitution; symbols or artifacts; and
beliefs, which are "the fundamental principles and goals
supported by the members of the political system"

(16-18,

quote on 18).
For the individual, a political culture performs
several functions.
external world.
that world.

It provides a mental map of the

In turn this map influences perception of

Social behavior, the interaction of the

individual with the world, is consequently shaped by
political culture.

In this way, the culture value system

tends to maintain itself across generations, and thereby,
becomes an important aspect of the maintenance of social
and psychological order (7-14) .

The change that does occur
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does so through the environmental feedback loop of
traditional systems theory (18-32).
Thus where Converse identifies two important
ideologies at work in the American political system, Devine
is interested in a single political culture.

And in fact

he identifies Lockean liberalism, particularly as described
by Hartz, as that political culture (47-65) .

But Devine

does not claim that liberalism is the fundamental value
system of all Americans, only most of them.

Therefore, it

may explain general tendencies and regime stability.

He

leaves unanswered, however, the question of cultural
variation and its importance.

Consequently, the

relationship between uniformity and variation in culture
and uniformity and variation in ideology is not explained.
Another difference between ideology and culture is that the
former focuses on rational coherence and the latter on
values.

Is it necessary to choose one over the other in

explaining systems of political belief?
Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1990) provide a theory
of culture which indicates that this is not necessary.
Their theory integrates dualisms such as fact-value and
stability-change.

"Rather than counterpoising rationality

and irrationality, we refer to competing social definitions
of what will count as rational.

No act can be classified

as in and of itself rational or irrational.

What is

rational depends on the social or institutional setting

within which the act is embedded"

(22-23).

The foundations

for the "social or institutional setting," according to
Thompson and his colleagues, are described as "ways of
life."

Each of the five possible ways of life provides a

vision of the workings of nature and of society.

When an

individual holds to a particular way of life, the elements
of political culture: identity, rules, beliefs, are largely
set.

Change may occur as individuals move from one way of

life to another, but stability of the collective system is
maintained as long as the distribution of individuals
within the five categories is roughly constant (25-100) .
Adding these insights to a theory of culture makes an
integration of culture and ideology possible.

If the ways

of life are the foundations of culture and provide the
setting for reasoning, they would also be the foundation
for ideologies.

A source of cultural and ideological

variation is also evident in the existence of alternative
ways of life even within a single society.

But the culture

concept remains fairly vague; what is its form within human
reasoning?
change?

Which factors are important to stability and

How do only five ways of life translate into the

vast array of issue publics identified by Converse?

The sociological line of research has left students of
public opinion with questions.

Other efforts to interpret

the opinions of Americans have begun with a shift in focus.
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This shift has resulted in attention being given to
political thought at the individual level.

Often borrowing

heavily from psychological theories, researchers have
attempted to construct a model of the individual belief
system, and then examine the universality of the model.
The following is a more detailed exploration of some of
these ideas.
One body of research has evolved around the
recognition that individual issue opinions, like opinions
generally are evaluations: "Every opinion is a marriage of
information and values - information to generate a mental
picture of what is at stake and values to make a judgement
about it"

(Zaller 1991, 1215).

As such, the reasoning

goes, individual issue evaluations are made by comparing
issue alternatives to a set of values or priorities which
the individual holds.

If numerous issue positions are

derived from one or two deeply held values, there would be
constraint in the structure of the individual belief
system.

This type of constraint is usually referred to as

vertical constraint (Bern 1970), as opposed to the
horizontal constraint proposed by Converse (1964).

In this

research, the fundamental values through which people
evaluate policies are described as "core values."

As

numerous opinions are expected to be grounded in a fairly
narrow core, the structure of such belief systems is
described as hierarchical.

Furthermore, if large segments
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of the population share core values, this model is easily
generalizable to the population.

Consequently, it does

make sense to speak of mass belief systems despite the
theoretical grounding in individual psychological
phenomena.

This latter observation has guided the choosing

of the specific core values which have been empirically
examined.

As a rule, investigators have concentrated their

search for core values in the political culture literature,
arguing that the political culture is a set of commonly
held values.
Lane (1973) was among the first to study systems of
political belief as psychological phenomena and to suggest
that specific opinions are grounded in general principles.
Though their primary concern is the importance of schemas,
Conover and Feldman (1980; 1984) incorporate this depiction
of belief system structure into their own research.

They

argue that different schemas exist at different levels of
abstraction (1984, 98) with one general schema of "basic
human nature and social interaction" at the most abstract
level (104).

Empirically, they find that opinions at the

various levels which they establish are indeed highly
correlated.

Thus, though the evidence of schemas in this

work has been questioned (Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland,
1991) the evidence of vertical constraint is clear (Conover
and Feldman 1984, 113).

Hurwitz and Peffley (1987; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985)
have achieved similarly remarkable results by directing
their focus on foreign policy beliefs.

Building on

previous, descriptive opinion analysis, they propose a
three tiered structure for foreign policy belief systems,
with "general postures" expected to be intermediary factors
between core values and specific issue positions.
Empirically, this domain specific approach proves valuable:
"the general pattern of our results, however, clearly
indicates that when constraint is measured as a series of
vertical relationships between attitudes at different
levels of abstraction, the degree of structure among
foreign-policy attitudes is generally impressive"

(1111) .

In explaining their findings, Hurwitz and Peffley
respond to the question "'How is it possible for ordinary
citizens to put together a consistent outlook on politics,
given they know so little about it?'"

They answer by

citing the social-psychological importance of heuristics.
Such a structure as they have described simplifies the
environment and makes up for absence of information;

"thus,

a paucity of information does not impede structure and
consistency, it motivates the development and employment of
structure"

(1114) .

This observation requires comment.

In these authors'

own words, the sphere of international politics is
extremely "complex" and "ambiguous"

(1103).

This is true
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of most all of politics.

So while it may be meaningful to

speak of elites who have more information than the general
public, it is certainly meaningless to speak of anyone as
having complete and perfect information.
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock,

In the words of

"the problem...is not that

mass publics know too little, but that no one knows enough"
(1991, 71).

Given, then, that "paucity of information,"

when compared to complete information, is a
characterization of everyone, there is reason to believe
that some sort of heuristic is a universal belief system
characteristic.

Any theory of belief systems must in some

way provide for this act of simplification of reality.
Given the empirical evidence from this body of research, we
should certainly expect a cognitive hierarchy to be an
element of this process.
More recently, work on core values and belief system
constraint was done by Feldman (1988).

Feldman extracts

three core values from political culture literature.

These

values are belief in equality of opportunity, support for
economic individualism, and support for the free enterprise
system (419).

Recognizing that all three are components of

Lockean liberalism, he theorizes that variations in the
degree to which individuals believe in these values will
explain variation in policy positions and, consequently,
belief systems.

Empirically, Feldman demonstrates that

there is indeed significant variation among Americans in
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the importance of these values.

But the relationship

between these particular values and issue positions does
not appear to be very strong; though one of Feldman's
proposed values, equality of opportunity, does predict
issue positions fairly consistently (427-429).
Feldman's results lead to speculation that other core
values, perhaps not related to Lockean liberalism, are
important.

Leege and Welch (1989) explore values not

related to liberalism.

They have contributed to our

understanding of the hierarchical structure of belief
systems by focusing on a subset of the population.

Namely

their interest is in the foundational religious beliefs of
Catholics.

Their work is "grounded in the notion that, to

understand religiosity, perceptions about the phenomena
that religion is thought to address are more important than
the embrace of doctrinal symbols or the associational
practice of religious rituals"

(138).

Thus while most

social scientists who examine religious elements focus on
group membership,

(see discussion below) these authors are

interested in something more closely related to core
values.
For Leege and Welch, foundational beliefs are, in
part,

"operating beliefs that interpret and give meaning to

the reality perceived by the individual"

(140).

Catholic church they identify and individualismcommunitarianism continuum at the heart of belief

Within the
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differences.

And in fact differences along this scale are

shown to have significant influence on some policy
opinions.

Specifically, the individualism-communitarian

belief is a better predictor of private sphere issues, e.g.
gender, family, etc. than more public policies such as race
relations and defense (151-160).
Empirical results in the literature on core values and
the structure of belief systems do seem to indicate that
there is something to the concept; we should certainly not
accept a null hypothesis that belief systems are not
grounded in core values.

Nevertheless, some fundamental

questions remain: how core is core? and what exactly
constitutes a value?

The most pressing question, however,

is one of verisimilitude; do core values accurately reflect
how people think about politics?

Do abstract concepts like

freedom or isolationism exist independently in peoples
minds, perhaps along with a specific definition?

Or do

these values exist in some sort of cognitive context?
These questions require a slightly more broad theoretical
perspective for their exploration.
The real contribution of core values research is that
it demonstrates very clearly the theoretical link between
the sociological and psychological approaches to the study
of belief systems.

It is apparent that core values have

sociological origins, often being derived from the
individual's cultural environment.

This theoretical
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relationship between sociological and psychological
explanations is further indication that an integrative
theory of the type suggested by Bennett is possible.

Another theoretical perspective on belief systems has grown
out of Converse's (1964) finding that nearly half of the
population evaluated policies in terms of how they affected
various social groups.

Theoretically, the argument is

offered that individuals form psychological attachments to
groups and evaluate policies based on expected impact on
those groups.

Kinder summarizes much of the research which

had been published in this area prior to the time he wrote
his synopsis of the public opinion literature (1983).

At

that time the key discoveries were that class was not a
significant factor in American public opinion, but that
race was strongly related to opinions on racial issues
(405-06).

The importance of the latter finding is

magnified if the Carmines and Stimson (1982, 1989) argument
about the centrality of race in mass belief systems is
accepted.
Subsequent to the Kinder summary, numerous theoretical
refinements have been suggested.

Wald, Owen, and Hill

(1988, 1990), for example, have focused attention on
churches as social groups of some import in the structure
of belief systems.

In their study of the political

cohesion of protestant churches, they find a great deal of
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variation between congregations in the degree of solidarity
of members' opinions.

In general fundamentalist churches,

ones with strong beliefs in moral traditionalism, the
authority of the bible, and "commitment to the church as a
source of truth," are found to be far more unified than
more liberal churches (1990, 209-213).
The importance of this work lies in its uniting of
social groups and a notion clearly similar to core values.
It is clear in this research that the degree to which the
social group plays an important role in political opinions
is related to the sharing of certain fundamental beliefs.
Though in the case of churches this may be a product of the
self selection process of voluntary membership, the basic
finding may also apply to non-voluntary groups.

For

example, the importance of race in political attitudes may
be a consequence of shared fundamental values.
The empirical findings of Miller, Wlezien, and
Hildreth (1991) support this proposition.

As is true of

much of the literature in this field, the trick to
exploring the importance of group membership to belief
systems is ascertaining which particular groups are
important to people.

Miller and his associates attempt to

get beyond demographic characteristics and explore how
social groups cluster together in the minds of citizens.
They do this by factor analyzing feeling thermometers about
various demographic groups.

From the rather extensive
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lists of groups asked about in the NES, three or four
definite factors (depending on the year) emerge from this
procedure.

The strength of these factors indicates that

people generally recognize similarities and differences
between the groups which go beyond superficial
categorization.

Thus, these findings are consistent with

the suggestion that the feeling thermometer evaluations are
grounded in perceptions of values held by the groups
compared to values held by the individual
Sniderman 1985).

(Brady and

This interpretation is further supported

by the additional finding that these factors are themselves
good predictors of candidate and party evaluations (Miller,
Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991) .
Shingles (1989) makes a similar contribution to our
understanding of the importance of social groups.

He does

so, however, by focusing on intra-group differences rather
than assuming intra-group similarities.

His concern is the

upper end of the traditional social stratification.

Prior

literature offers two seemingly contradictory arguments
about what the values and consequent policy opinions of
this group should be: one suggests that elites are more
conservative, the other that they are more liberal.
Shingles finds that the resolution to this paradox lies in
part in the distinction between status and class; status
being roughly understood as a prestige or educated elite
while class is defined in purely economic terms (1989).
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This is further indication that what is important to policy
opinion is not superficial group membership but common
values perhaps generated by common experience.

Recently an altogether new tack has been taken in the study
of social groups and systems of political belief.

Rather

than focusing on group identity as a psychological
characteristic, attribution theory explores the opinions
people have about groups to which they do not belong.
Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth (1991) have given us some
indication of positive or negative feelings about various
groups, but the attribution approach stresses the
importance of characteristics which people assign to
others.

The suggestion is that assigning certain

characteristics to persons will influence political
evaluations.

These persons may be individual candidates

for office or large segments of the population.

The object

of study may be voting behavior or policy positions.

But

there are common elements of political evaluation as it is
described within this theoretical context.

These include

persons, their actions, the character traits which lead to
their actions, and the consequences of these actions.

The

following studies exemplify this research.
Conover's (1980) interest is in how people perceive
and evaluate candidates for office.

She suggests and

demonstrates empirically that people attribute character
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traits to candidates in one of two ways depending on the
amount of information they posses.

Individuals who have

very little accurate information may make "trait
inferences."

Trait inferences are made according to

"stereotype or expectations about group characteristics"
for groups of which the candidate is a member, e.g. party
(94).

For voters with a good deal of information on

candidates' behavior,

"causal attribution" is possible.

That is the candidates' characteristics are deduced
directly from observation of the candidate him or herself
(94-95).

Of course, any interpretation of behavior will

probably be tied to "stereotypes or expectations about
group characteristics," so making this analytical
distinction may be problematic.

The important point,

however, is that in either case, the key elements of
cognition are persons, personalities, and corresponding
behavior.
Sigelman and Knight (1985) perform a similar analysis
of evaluations of the incumbent president.

Their

theoretical interest is the attribution of responsibility,
particularly for the economy.
find that personalizing,

Analyzing survey data, they

"holding the president personally

and directly responsible for the economy," is "widespread"
(187).

This personalizing process tends to be independent

of political knowledge.
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The importance of heuristics has been previously
discussed, and implicit in this work is the idea that
personalizing is a psychological act of simplification.
Sigelman and Knight do not in any way suggest that those
who personalize have a precise understanding of just how
the president should limit inflation, for example.

In

fact, the two possible explanations they offer for
personalizing are: people personalize due to ignorance, or
because presidents and other elites "say" they can limit
inflation.

Again, in either case, the nature of the

simplification is particularly revealing; it is personal,
incorporating persons and the effects of their actions.
Turning to policy evaluations, Iyengar (1989)
"advances a domain-specific theory of public opinion in
which the primary consideration that governs any issue
position is the assignment of responsibility for the issue
in question.

In other words, individuals tend to simplify

political issues by reducing them to questions of
responsibility, and their issue opinions flow from their
answers to these questions"

(879).

In order to test this

theory, Iyengar examines the relationship between responses
to questions about causal and treatment responsibilities
for four social problems.

The four problems are poverty,

racial inequality, crime, and terrorism.

Empirically he

finds that the relationships are generally very strong.

In

most cases the attribution of responsibility variables are
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more powerful predictors of policy opinions than party
identification or liberal/conservative orientation (889—
893) .
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) find evidence of
similar cognitive structures.

Recall the "desert

heuristic" cited above:
A perception that some person or group is in need
gives rise to a search for causation (why does
the need exist?). In turn, the causal
conclusions that people reach have important
implications for their reactions to the needy
individual or group...Did the need arise as a
result of some internal characteristic of the
actor or some aspect of the external environment?
(72)
This is a fairly clear statement of the how the characters,
character traits, actions, reactions, and consequences of
attribution fit together in political reasoning.
The psychological attachment and attribution theories
confirm Converse's initial findings that social groups are
important elements of American public opinion.

Beyond mere

confirmation, however, they offer a much richer
understanding of the nature of that importance; something
more fundamental than demographics is at work here.
Neither elites nor masses should be lumped together
indiscriminately when describing their belief systems.
theory of mass belief systems should allow for
substantially more complexity.

Research into social

groups, however, also gives rise to some optimism in the
search for the foundations of belief systems.

The

Any
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integration of groups with values, which seems to emerge
from recent studies, grants clarity and credence to both
approaches.

These theoretical advances make firmer the

foundation for a still more broad theory of belief systems.

The psychological concept schema has provided still another
approach to the study of belief systems.

Though the value

of the concept is somewhat controversial, research in this
area has added to our understanding of political cognition.
Conover and Feldman (1984) explore the structure of
political thinking given the fact that most people do not
think ideologically (95).

As these investigators use the

term, a schema is a structure of memory which influences
the way new information is received and the way stored
information is retrieved (96).

Extrapolating the

implications of this concept, they argue that schema theory
"helps to bridge the gaps among previous conceptualizations
of the nature and structure of mass belief systems"

(98).

As examples of this bridging they suggest that some schemas
may be more abstract or general and thus function as core
belief systems.

Belief system constraint can also be

conceptualized in schematic terms.

In addition, particular

schemas are believed to develop out of environmental
interaction, but they then become internal mental
structures.

Thus this theory links the sociological and
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psychological approaches to the study of mass belief
systems (99).
The empirical strategy adopted by Conover and Feldman
is one in which they, as the researchers,

"define the

possible range of content (i.e. the elements) for each
domain and at differing levels of abstraction, and then
allow the respondents to identify, through some sort of
rating task, the nature of the schemas that are most
relevant to their own particular way of looking at that
portion of the political world"

(101-02).

The Q-sort

method is used which allows respondents to rank order
opinions.

Various sorts are established at various levels

of abstraction.

Next the results are factor analyzed to

find patterns in the sorting.

And finally, correlations

between these factors are examined to determine their
relationship to each other.

The results indicate that

there is a great deal of structure, especially vertical
constraint, in the belief systems of the respondents.
There are numerous significant correlations between factors
at the different levels of abstraction (113-14).
Continuing with the "bridging the gap" theme, Allen,
Dawson, and Brown (1989) explore the relationship between
schemas and the political beliefs of a particular social
group, i.e., African-Americans.

Beginning with the

observation that blacks are generally different from whites
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in their political opinions, the authors search for the
origins of these differences.

They argue that

racial identity is a multi-dimensional concept.
Each dimension is conceived as being based on one
of the cognitive schema[s]. We assume that the
African-American racial belief system is composed
of multiple cognitive schema[s] and that these
schema[s] are distinctive but interrelated
cognitive constructs that vary across individuals
in their degree of intensity within the black
population (423).
In examining the qualities of a separate system of
political beliefs for a segment of the population, Allen,
Dawson, and Brown are also interested in the origins of
these mental constructs.

They find that social status,

religious affiliation, and exposure to the black media are
important contributors to unique African-American schemas.
More generally, it is clear that personal experiences and
information sources do influence the reception and
arrangement of knowledge.
Lau, Smith, and Fiske (1991) look more directly to the
effects of schemas than to their sources.

Of interest to

these authors is the filtering influence cognitive
structures have on tendencies to accept or reject policy
interpretations of others.
interpretive process.

In other words they focus on an

Utilizing a pair of experiments by

which they can control information, they find that previous
knowledge does influence the acceptance of policy
alternatives.
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Despite these apparent successes, there are problems
with this approach to the study of belief systems.

One

such problem is the vagueness in the term "mental
construct" which is offered as a definition of schema.
Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland (1991) point out this and
several other limitations of the schema concept.

Factors

such as those produced by Conover and Feldman "are
statistical abstractions, not necessarily thoughts anyone
in the sample has actually had"

(1343).

And if this is

true of the factors themselves, it is certainly true of the
correlations between the factors.

These authors also point

out that the concept itself is strikingly similar to the
concept "attitude"

(1345).

Most importantly, however, is

the observation that the theory "is at best incomplete,"
ignoring issues like "the coordination and integration of
schemas, necessary to solving novel problems," "it has
relatively little to say about the internal structure of
schemas," and there is an absence of social context (1346).
The real advantage of the schema concept for the study
of systems of political belief is not its originality or
its completeness but that "bridging the gap" quality
pointed out by Conover and Feldman (1984).

This literature

review has argued that many of the theoretical approaches
to the study of belief systems may be related to each
other.
theory.

To date, schema theory provides the best integrated
It ties together in a single package experience,
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coiranunication of information, memory, interpretation of
future experience and information, and evaluations of
policy and other political stimuli.
The next theoretical step in belief system research
should be the development of a similar but richer theory,
one which spells out the nature of political cognition more
precisely.

A theory is required which incorporates context

as well as flexibility, thereby explaining stability and
change.

The next two chapters attempt to construct such a

theory utilizing the ideas and discoveries presented in
this chapter as building materials.

CHAPTER II
MYTHS AND POLITICAL BELIEFS

The initial assumption on which this chapter is built
is that the black box approach to developing an integrated
theory of belief systems is inadequate; even if the black
box has a fancy name like schema.

It is not sufficient to

say schema has these origins: preachers, television; these
functions: storage, retrieval; and these effects:
filtering, interpretation.

More detail is needed on the

nature of cognitive constructs.

What is it, for example,

that holds individual schemas together and relates them to
each other?

What types of information are they capable of

handling?
This chapter is a first pass at developing a more
precise conceptualization of political cognition.

A

preliminary step in developing such a theory is the
integration of two seemingly "divergent viewpoints"
(Bennett 1977, 473).

The first is the apparent importance

of attribution theory in the study of belief systems.

It

has been shown that research in this area, especially the
work by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991), indicates
that the attribution of characteristics, attitudes, and
responsibility to individuals and groups is an important
aspect of political evaluation.

A second quality of

political cognition for which there is a great deal of
evidence, but which seems to be quite different from
41
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attribution theory, is its hierarchical arrangement.
Specific policy positions are thought to be grounded in
more general political principles or values.
The argument that these two viewpoints can be
integrated into a single theory begins with movement from
each of them in the direction of greater theoretical
generality.

Each approach leaves an important question:

the core values literature does not suggest a context for
values, and the attribution literature does not explain the
structural relationships of attributions.

Might these two

approaches mesh together on these points?
The key to the answer lies in the form of political
cognition which is revealed in the attribution literature.
Consider again as an example the desert heuristic described
by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991).

The cognitive

glue that unites the persons, character traits, behavior,
and responsibilities of attribution theory seems to be the
story; plot is clearly implicit in this portrayal of
reasoning.

Political evaluations of presidents and

policies seem to be grounded in anecdotal perceptions.
However much or little information people do posses, that
information seems to be stored and processed in a narrative
form.
And there is evidence that this is not mere
theoretical manipulation; when given a chance to explain
their own beliefs, people often tell stories.

Within an
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attribution theoretical context, Knight (1992) examines
"natural language" responses to a question asking why black
Americans are generally worse off than whites.

Consider

the following answers:
because the blacks they don't care//I'm saying
that according to where you see there are many
white people care more what they are doing, they
are very much concerned about every day life
whereas blacks they live according to, they don't
have a systematic way of living...because a
majority of women are on welfare and they have so
many sexual partner who do not support them they
just make them pregnant and that's when the women
ends up being on welfare...(Table 1)
And from the opposite end of Knight's internal/external
continuum of explanations:
lack of education and prejudice//inner city
schools big city schools//most of the coloreds
lived in the big city schools and most of the
blacks got pushed into big city schools. When I
went to school there were one or two colors, but
when you go to a big school in the inner city in
New York you get lost in the system...(Table 1)
Even in responses to this question consisting of only a few
words, similar social phenomena are implied.
If narratives are common elements of political
cognition, and if belief systems are hierarchically
arranged, perhaps some sort of core narratives are the
foundations of belief systems and provide a context for
core values.

These core narratives might exist as

fundamental and general visions of the nature of social
relationships, with other, less abstract stories derived

therefrom.

In other words, rather than precise definitions

of concepts like freedom, for example, belief systems may
be based in visions of unrestricted social interaction.

It

should be noted that there is nothing in the core values
literature which precludes their having such a context.
Consequently, uniting these two theoretical approaches is a
reasonable analytical step in the search for an integrated
theory of belief systems.
Guided by an interest in the role of core narratives
in systems of political belief, this chapter brings a
wholly different literature to bare on the study of belief
systems.

This literature is on an existing social science

concept which seems most similar to an idea of core
narrative, namely myth.
discussion of myth.

This chapter will begin with a

This presentation will consist of some

basic and generally agreed upon observations about its
nature, origins, and functions.

An example of a particular

myth relevant in the American political context will then
be discussed in an effort to clarify these issues.

Next

the relationship between the concepts myth and belief
system will be explored.

What will emerge from this

discussion is a tremendous theoretical similarity between
the nature and function of myth and the phenomena belief
system.

Finally, some of the characteristics of a myth

based belief system will be discussed.
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Myth is a central concept in the study of human behavior as
undertaken by anthropologists and scholars in related
fields.

Whether ancient or modern, domestic or exotic,

societies can be analyzed and compared in terms of the
myths which inform the lives of the people in them.

Myths

are often seen as being at the core of particular patterns
of societal arrangement and interaction.

The relevance of

myth to many aspects of politics has also been observed.
Eliade, for example, reveals the structural similarities of
grand political ideologies like Marxism and Aryanism and
some very ancient myths (1960, 25-27).

Lasswell and Kaplan

(1950) point out the importance of myths in maintaining
social order.
Though they are narratives and to some extent elements
of imagination, the term myth does not imply a lie.

Rather

the relationship between a myth and experience is very
intimate and, as will be shown, circular.

"'Myth' means a

'true story' and, beyond that, a story that is a most
precious possesion because it is sacred, exemplary,
significant (Eliade 1963, 1).

For example, while the

details regarding the characters and their activities may
not be empirically accurate, the myth may reveal some acute
insight into the nature of human motivations and actions
(Jung 1958).
Blumenberg (1985) argues that the creation and
duration of myths stem from the complexity of mankind's

environment.

He points out that this environment is too

complex to allow full comprehension.

How ever vast and

varied experience may be, only "partial knowledge" of this
world will be achieved.

The myth is a narrative created to

weave the elements of this partial knowledge into a more
holistic vision of reality.

In other words the imagination

is brought to bare on an incomplete and incoherent
collection of facts transforming them into a cohesive image
of interconnected parts.

Thereby myths enable people to

develop a picture of the world which is sensible and to
interact with it in sensible ways.
It follows from this initial observation, that myths
are the narratives which weave disparate experiences into
whole cloth, that myths are intimately related to the
empirical experiences and observations of life.

For a myth

to be meaningful, it must incorporate the partial knowledge
which people have acquired.

A story or set of stories

which does not correspond to people's lived lives will not
function as a myth for those people.
observed,

As Halpern has

"the study of myth is the study of the origins of

beliefs out of historical experience"

(1961, 137).

The consequences of myth, so conceived, for thought
and action are numerous.

For example, these stories come

to have a profound affect on perception of reality.
belief that the world is a certain way has a direct
influence on what is seen and how what is seen is

A
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interpreted. According to Bern (1970) "we hold a
nonconscious, zero-order faith in the credibility of our
'internal' sense that is comparable in every way to our
implicit trust in the credibility of our senses"

(49).

If

myths are part of this internal sense, then they would be
as important to our perception of reality as is physical
sight.

Myths may be held which do not allow comprehension

of experience which does not fit the existing image of the
world.

Because of this 'nonconscious zero-order faith' in

its rightness, new information and experience may be
ignored or interpreted in such a way that the myth is
preserved.

Thus the relationship between myth and

experience is not only intimate but circular; experience
generates myth, and myth influences the interpretation of
experience.
If, as has been suggested, myths mold empirical
experiences into a coherent vision of the whole of reality,
and they come to influence one's understanding of future
empirical experiences, then myths are also intimately
associated with an understanding of what is rational.

At

the most obvious level, any narrative must posses internal
rational coherence.

This would be particularly true of

myths which are intended to supply order to our perceptions
and discoveries.

This is an important point to make as, in

the "Enlightened" world, myth and reason are often seen as
mutually exclusive; myths are viewed as irrational beliefs.
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For some, the very purpose of science is to dispel myths
and other unfounded beliefs.

As the term is described by

those scholars cited here, however, science, or any other
body of rational inquiry, would be impossible without a
myth structure providing its foundation.

Blumenberg in

fact states explicitly that even during the Enlightenment
there was no move from mvthos to logos, but that both are
used to deal with the "absolutism of reality."

(xi-xii)

Consider also Geertz's observation that along with
other aspects of public discourse, myths "are felt somehow
to sum up, for those whom they are resonant, what is known
about the way the world is, the quality of the emotional
life it supports, and the way one ought to behave while in
it"

(1973).

This statement expresses an important point

about myths and their relationship to reason.

It is at the

level of myth that the positive and the normative are
linked.

"What is known about the way the world is" becomes

a standard for evaluation of "the way

one ought to behave

while in it," that is, a standard for human behavior.
There is life and activity in accordance with one's
perception of reality, and life at odds with that
perception.

To give one example, a myth that informs its

adherents that men are the dominant gender may lead to the
rational conclusion that men should be the leader of the
family unit.

Within such a belief system, a matriarchal

family would be viewed as an aberration.

Politically
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speaking, within such a society matriarchal families may be
illegal.
Beyond these functions within individual
consciousness, myths play important roles at the
collective, social level.

Like most stories, myths are

related by their adherents to others.

In various ways,

intentional and unintentional, direct and indirect, people
express the elements of the myths which provide order in
their lives, which tie together the partial knowledge which
they have acquired.

Thus listeners, those who are seeking

a unifying vision, are exposed to existing myths. To the
extent that one or more of these myths mesh with the
listeners own empirical experience, they may be accepted as
valid, as stories revealing truth.
It is in this way that myths become a binding force in
societies and for groups within societies; myths are not
only reactions to a complex environment but also play an
active role in communities.

The narratives which the

individual will find most meaningful are those he or she
hears from people who have had similar experiences.
result is connectedness.

The

To the degree that myths are

shared, the individual will find a place in a society of
like minded individuals.

Myths, then, can be described as

defining a social context and social orientation for the
individual (Geertz 1973).
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Myths are understood to be very powerful and
fundamental narratives structuring a person's orientation
to his or her environment.

They link together the parts of

that environment into a cohesive vision of reality.
Thereby, they have an impact on what is seen, what is
understood to be rational, and on evaluations of human
behavior.

They are attributes of the individual

consciousness which, when shared with others, provide a
social context for action and interaction.

We can

conclude, therefore, that not only are they not illusions
or falsehoods, myths are at the heart of what is perceived
as being true.

These issues will be clarified by putting some flesh on
these theoretical bones.

In order to demonstrate the

character and function of myth in the American political
environment, a discussion of the historical evolution of an
important American narrative follows.

This discussion is

intended to be suggestive not exhaustive; it is intended as
a discussion of an example of the existence and functioning
of myths in the United States, not as a definitive analysis
of all of the important narratives.
The most obvious candidate for a myth base of American
politics is liberalism.

The importance of liberalism in

American politics generally, and public opinion
specifically, is well documented (e.g. Devine 1972; Elazar
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1972; Feldman 1983; Hartz 1955; McCloskey and Zaller 1984;
Sniderman and Brody 1970).
a myth?

But why refer to liberalism as

Consider the following portrayal of its role in

American history.
The dominant narratives in the American context are
the oldest ones, those which informed the writing of the
Constitution and continue to provide fundamental values in
many people's thoughts about politics.

As a rule, these

stories are products of the Enlightenment and its vision of
people and society.

Within this context, Locke told a

story of a state of nature in which individuals existed in
isolation, working and accumulating property.

But property

and other aspects of personal autonomy could be threatened
by rivals.

Thus the plot of this narrative is advanced by

a kind of deus ex machina known as the social contract.
This contract brings the force of society to the defence of
the individual.

Once the contract is accepted and members

of society are protected from their aggressive neighbors,
very little in the way of additional social control is
needed.
The importance of this and similar stories to the
authors of the Constitution has been noted by many
commentators on the document.

Some commentators also note

how the experiences of the American founders created
variations in this Enlightenment story.

Gordon Wood

(1969), for example, focuses his attention on the
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historical period between the Articles of Confederation and
the Constitution.

He argues that by the time the colonies

gathered to form a new national government, new stories
were being told: stories about legislative tyranny and
Daniel Shays.

The writing of the Constitution required

that these new stories be integrated with older stories
about despotism and the evil of centralized authority.

As

a result the Constitution does establish a much stronger
centralized government than did the Articles of
Confederation, one which is constrained by indirect
democracy.
Historically, the progressive period was a time of
large scale myth adaption to new experience.

In this case,

the experiences were the consequences of the industrial
revolution.

These consequences included political

corruption, unhealthful production techniques and consumer
products, and an expanding gap between the very wealthy few
and the very poor masses (Noble 1981).

Progressivism as an

intellectual response to these conditions has proven very
difficult to define, but one of its key elements is some
alteration of the Lockean myth of the social contract and
its insurance of equality.

A new character had entered the

American plot, the industrial tycoon.

In addition to his

responsibility for the above problems, his very existence
was seen by many as proof of the inadequacy of the dominant
myth, as evidence that equality would not naturally be
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maintained in a free society.

In response to this new

force in society, a counter force was needed.

Many came to

accept the propositions of people like Thomas Hill Green
that the government must accept this role, that the
government should act as the defender of equality, that the
government should play the role of hero of the workers to
the tycoon's role as villain.
The myth of government playing the role of defender of
the people came to exist side by side with a new, more pure
form of the Lockean liberal myth known as social darwinism
(Hofstadter 1955).

In this latter story, the government

continues to be seen as the principle threat to human
fulfillment.

Eventually these competing visions of society

would be labeled ideologies.
In addition to changes in response to new historical
circumstances,

there have always been those people in

American society for whom Locke's story was irrelevant.
This is particularly true for African-Americans.

The

existence of slavery is not an element of classical
liberalism.

Thus the institution existed in American

politics as a kind of sub-text to the dominant social
narrative.

This aberrant position of slavery in relation

to the ideals of equality and freedom manifested itself in
the founders inability to adequately resolve the issue and
the consequent war, and in the alienation of blacks from
American politics.
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In the contemporary American political environment,
things have changed and stayed the same.

There is evidence

that blacks, having been at least partially assimilated
into American politics, have adopted traditional American
stories (Allen, Dawson, and Brown 1989).

The more profound

change, however, has been yet another alteration of the
liberal myth from telling a story of equal individuals free
from government interference, to a story of competing
interest groups struggling to influence the actions of the
government.

Contemporary American politics is dominated by

a story entitled pluralism (Dahl, 1989).
This brief sketch of some key developments in American
history demonstrates how liberalism has functioned, how it
captured the minds of the founders as the fundamental
narrative about human interactions.

Liberalism has worked

to unite and divide American society throughout our
history.

It has influenced understanding of and reaction

to experience while at the same time adapting itself to a
changing world, integrating new characters and actions as
necessary.
But is referring to liberalism as a myth rather than
culture, ethos, or schema a mere word game?

Demonstrating

the advantages of a myth based belief system over the other
theoretical frameworks requires a more detailed
understanding of the theory of the former.

Consequently, a
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discussion of the general characteristics of myth and their
relevance to systems of political opinion is required.

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the
conceptual compatibility of myth and belief system.

Given

the state of the literature in this sub-field, the first
step in theoretical development must be a detailed
examination of the object of study; a prerequisite of any
proposed theory must be that it potentially explains the
phenomena under investigation.

As indicated by previous

research, an account of individual belief systems must
incorporate standards of evaluation, provide for some kind
of systematic simplification of political reality, explain
foundations for assimilation and interpretation of
experience and information, and allow rational integration
of various aspects of politics.

At the collective level,

an account of the mass belief system must explain
similarities and differences between individuals.

The

concept myth can account for these elements of belief
systems .
As noted above, the context in which belief systems
are formed is a factor of some moment in choosing an
appropriate theoretical explanation.

To understate the

obvious: the political world is complex.

It may not be the

"absolutism of reality" which, Blumenberg argues, myths are
created to explain, but it is a pretty good chunk of that
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reality.

Only partial knowledge of political reality is

possible given its vastness and intricacy.
Christopher Achen,

In the words of

"the sheer volume of business in a large

nation makes it impossible for even the most studious voter
to follow more than a fraction of it" (1975, 1218) .
Consider the issue of defense spending.

Even if the value

of preserving national security regardless of cost is a
rational initial assumption, what kind of information
should an individual have in order to reach a conclusion on
whether spending should be increased or decreased?

The

most superficial thought on the subject reveals that one
would have to know: current spending, efficiency of
spending, what is purchased, the same information on our
potential enemies, and some fairly sophisticated
understanding of military strategy.

I propose that most

people who have an opinion on defense spending have very
little of this information.

And our democratic political

process expects us to formulate opinions on many such
issues; issues as important to life and happiness as they
are complex.
This combination of the complexity and importance of
political questions is indication that an examination of
myths may reveal something of the nature of belief systems.
Recall that one of the important functions of myth is the
simplification of an environment which is far too vast and
intricate for us to comprehend.

Even the political
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environment is far too vast and intricate for us to
comprehend.

The various "ideas and attitudes" which

comprise a belief system, consequently, must be grounded in
some simplified conceptions of that environment.

The idea

of myth provides a parsimonious and powerful explanation of
this process.
Further indication of the theoretical compatibility of
myth and belief system is revealed by continuing this
comparison of what a myth is to what a belief system is.
As commonly operationalized, the "ideas and attitudes"
which comprise a belief system are various policy positions
(see chapter one).

Like most opinions, these policy

positions are evaluations.

In turn, the act of evaluation

is an act of comparison to some standard or expectation.
The issue of gun control, for example, is compared against
the standard of beliefs about what contributes to personal
security.

One person might conclude that he or she would

be safer if guns were more difficult to obtain and there
were fewer of them in society.

This leads to the

conclusion that increased regulation is a good.

Another

individual might conclude that he or she would in fact be
less secure to the extent that self protection was made
difficult by limits on the acquisition of fire arms.

Thus

opposition to gun control is the logical policy position
for such a person to hold.

Both of these lines of

reasoning stem from different expectations about the
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relationship between human behavior and weapons.

The first

believes that ease of acquisition of guns contributes to
the likelihood that a person will use one in committing a
violent crime.

The latter assumes that there are those

people who will commit violent crimes regardless of
circumstances, and that those people will obtain guns
regardless or legal restrictions.
option is personal defense.

Consequently, the only

Almost any political issue

requires a similar sort of evaluation built on
expectations, built on beliefs about the way the world is.
Any explanation of belief systems must explain this
process.
Based on the observations above, myth may well provide
such an explanation.

The narratives which unify our

understanding of reality do provide us with our
understanding of the positive,

"criminals will have guns,"

which become the basis of the normative,
to protect myself."
world,

"I should be free

Different perceptions of the real

"guns themselves contribute to crime," lead to

different evaluative conclusions,
restricted."

"gun ownership should be

Both of the statements of fact reveal the

narrative links between people and between people and
objects in the awareness of the individuals who accept
them.

They may have there origins in empirical experience

or in socialization.

As they stand, however, they are two

different perceptions of the way the world is which lead to
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two different conclusions about what should be done.

In

this way myth meets yet another test for a theoretical
framework appropriate to the study of belief systems; it
can explain variations in opinions on individual policy
issues.
It can also inferred that the concept myth sheds light
on how various policy positions cluster together into
individual belief systems.

Implicit in most researchers'

understanding of belief system is the expectation that
rationality will be an integral part of its "constraint."
In examining belief systems, we look for how the various
elements are rationally integrated into a whole.

Again the

theory of myth outlined above appears to be precisely on
point.

Rational narratives, in connecting observations,

discoveries, and partial knowledge, provide the very
foundation of an understanding of what constitutes a
rational relationship.

One understanding of the world

allows an individual to see support for abortion and
opposition to the death penalty as rationally compatible
issue positions.

For another person, one who sees both as

acts of murder, for example, this is an irrational
combination of issue positions.

Almost any pair or set of

issue positions can be rationally compatible depending on
the individual's fundamental orientation to reality.
are understood to provide just such fundamental
orientations.

Myths
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These three factors, issues of simplification,
evaluation, and constraint, demonstrate the importance of
myths to the individual belief system; there is reason to
believe they are central elements of political cognition.
This is not the end, however, of the theoretical relevance
of myth to belief system.
well.

Myths are social phenomena as

Communities with common experiences often share

narrative portrayals of that experience.

Consequently,

myth provides an explanation of how individual belief
systems are integrated into mass belief systems.

According

to the ideas presented here, individual belief systems
should be linked at their core; mass belief systems should
be built on common foundations.
Collectively, these observations on the nature of
myths and belief systems suggest the existence of a
powerful theoretical infrastructure.

The created and

received character of myths allows an understanding of
variation, pattern, and patterns of variation in people's
understanding of reality.

Any explanation of belief

systems must allow similar understanding.

Myths function

as standards of evaluation and foundations of rationality.
Belief systems are expected to be rationally coherent
clusters of evaluations.
reality.

Myths also function to simplify

The formation of opinions in a complex,

democratic political environment requires some process of
simplification.
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Though by no means complete, an image of myth based belief
systems is beginning to develop.

A few of its

characteristics are now discernable.
One conclusion supported by this discussion of myths
is that they are as varied as the experiences which they
are created to encompass. Various myths may be appropriate
to various realms of experience: religious myths express
metaphysical experience, cultural myths relating visions of
social relationships, family myths uniting those of common
hearth.

Within any individual consciousness, myths from

these and perhaps many more categories will coexist.

Any

society might be held together by a shared myth relevant to
a particular realm of experience.

For example, a

particular story of power relationships between various
elements of society might be commonly accepted by citizens.
This political myth may contribute to long term political
consistency (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950).
In the United States, however, though a dominant myth
seems to exist, Lockean liberalism, the student of public
opinion must recognize the existence of a variety of core
narratives.

For example, as discussed above, this myth is

foreign to the experiences of African-Americans.

Further,

diversity should be expected as a product of the
permeability of our national boarders.

The country is not

an isolated society in which a dominant myth remains
unchallenged.

Immigration of people and their narrative
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traditions has been a constant factor in the nation's
history.

Furthermore, the United States is a very large

and heterogeneous nation with a population exposed to a
broad range of experiences; consider the contrast between
the South and the rest of the union (Key 1977) .

And as

previously discussed, experience is the source of creation
and revision of myths.

For these reasons also, it is

prudent to expect the presence of numerous myths in the
public opinion of Americans.
Further complicating the analysis of the relationship
between myths and public opinion is the fact that
explicitly political myths are not the only ones which
might be relevant to belief systems.

Just as politics is

not isolated from other elements of society, neither are
only political experiences influential on political
opinions.

Religious myths, for example may be an important

factor for all or any part of an individual's political
belief system.

Consequently, analysis should not be

limited to narratives which appear to be political in
nature.
Another point which requires consideration: shared
myths are not static but may be altered by personal
experience.

Here again there is reason to be cautious in

expectations of observable manifestations of the theory.
Even a powerful, political myth like liberalism may present
itself in slightly differentiated forms from person to
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person.

One person, for example, may have been affected by

an encounter with poverty which may have led him or her to
recognize the need for some limits on social freedom.
Context, therefore, is a crucial aspect of how a myth
functions within a particular belief system.
Much of what is true of shared myths is also true of a
host of more humble narratives.

Personal encounters with

the world and personal creativity produce narratives which
are potentially unique to the individual.

Past events are

remembered and future events anticipated in narrative form
(Crites 1971).

Consider again the desert heuristic as

described by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) .

They

have argued that individuals evaluate policies based on
perceptions about characters, character traits, future
interactions with the government based on knowledge of
previous interactions, and other such narrative elements.
Evaluations of and responses to daily life are grounded in
a plethora of such depictions of reality.

It is clear that

these more personal and mundane stories are also elements
of political belief systems.
more social and broader myths?

But how do these differ from
Would it be possible to say

anything of significance about these daily narratives
outside of their mythical context?
Ultimately, it must be the whole narrative cloth which
serves as the foundation of interaction with and evaluation
of political reality.

Individuals develop a system of
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beliefs about relationships expressed in a narrative
format, a format which is grounded in empirical experience
but is also a simplification and an interpretation of that
experience.

At the individual level, it now appears that

belief systems are built on a rather intricate narrative
web.

In this context, myths may be thought of as the

strands which are common to many of the individual webs.
Taken as a whole, then, the narrative web is a mental
network of characters.

These characters may be

individuals, groups, prototypical representatives of
groups, governments, etc.

These actors are perceived as

displaying particular character traits, e.g. laziness,
aggressiveness, corruption.

These character traits play an

important role in the actions and interactions of the
characters which comprise the plots of the stories.
Circumstances and settings also play an important role in
how plots develop.

The various elements of this mental

network can be learned from others, memories of experience,
or anticipated scenarios.

Together they provide an image

of how the world is, how vast amounts of raw information
fit together to form a rational whole.

They become

foundations of emotional response as well as standards of
evaluation for the individual.
Though there will be originality within any individual
narrative pattern and corresponding belief system, we also
expect that many of the individual threads are shared by
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many members of society.

There are shared experiences and

there are common narratives which give context and meaning
to those shared experiences.

These common threads, shared

myths, are the most appropriate focus of analysis of mass
belief systems.

Though they constitute only a part of any

individual web, it is an important part.

The discussion of

myths above leads us to expect them to play a rather
foundational role within the web.
This image of a myth based belief system is a very
complex one.

One element of this complexity is that belief

systems are expected to be belief systems in flux,
constantly evolving as they respond to the environment.
Furthermore the nature of that response, or even the
direction of evolution, defies prediction because any
response to new information or experience is partially
influenced by previous experiences and existing myths.
Thus variation in myths and other stories will lead to
various responses to identical experience.

Furthermore,

this theoretical description not only allows, but requires
acts of creativity.

The myths are not directly caused by

experience but are themselves part and parcel of belief
systems.
Though built on a rather simple foundation, the theory
of myth based belief systems as portrayed so far is quite
unwieldy.
change.

It is plagued by intricacy, indeterminacy, and
Is any systematic analysis of such a system
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possible?

The answer to this question is yes, but it

requires a certain transformation in the vision of the
analyst.

CHAPTER III
NARRATIVES AND A SELF-ORGANIZED BELIEF SYSTEM

Before attempting to deal with the problems raised by
suggesting a myth foundation for belief systems, this
chapter also begins by building directly on previous
research.

Whereas the previous chapter deals largely with

the nature of political beliefs, the concern here is the
nature of the system.

Thirty years of belief system

investigation has not answered the basic question.

Do

various beliefs fit together in a simple casual arrangement
as does a solar system?

Are they part of a more complex

system involving a feedback loop with the environment?

Or

are they simply random clusters of beliefs signifying
nothing?
Or are they something else?

This possibility has not

been generally considered in the analysis of belief systems
because political scientists have been limited in their
view of nature by a Newtonian paradigm.

In some of the

physical sciences, however, systems have been discovered
which do not conform to the classic laws of motion nor of
thermodynamics.

These systems are not reducible to linear,

causal explanations.

Instead they evidence properties of

"self-organization."
The first part of this chapter demonstrates that
systems of political belief are best conceived of as self
organized systems.

The evidence'that this is the case is
67

68
drawn from extant research.

I will proceed in this

demonstration by presenting several of the properties which
are common to most self-organized systems.

The discussion

of each property will be followed by observations from
political scientists about belief systems.

Taken

collectively, these observations indicate that belief
systems are typical of self-organized systems.
The movement from a traditional conception of system,
to a self-organized one has been described as requiring a
"Gestalt shift" on the part of the analyst.

That is,

analysts must see two faces instead of a vase; a mature
woman rather than a young one.

If this shift is accepted

as worthwhile by students of belief systems, an entirely
new research program is implied, new goals of analysis are
required.

As will be demonstrated below, the

characteristics of a self-organized system make some of the
objectives of earlier research impossible to achieve.
However, these same characteristics open up a whole new set
of fascinating questions about how systems act and
interact.
One question which can be asked about such systems is
"what is the organizational process which guides the
systems development?"

In the second part of this chapter,

I will argue that narrative is the organizational process
for systems of political belief.

In this context, a more

fully developed discussion of the importance of narrative

69
generally and myth specifically in cognition will be
presented.

While chapter two presented an argument that a

relationship between myth and belief system is possible,
the second part of this chapter suggests that this
relationship is likely.

The chapter concludes with a

summary portrayal of a myth based, self-organized belief
system.

"Self-organized system" is a general term for phenomena
discovered independently in many different fields of
inquiry.

These phenomena have been given this common label

because there are several attributes which they generally
share whether they consist of atoms, termites, or the
weather.

Many have suggested that human beings, our

endeavors, and our societies are far more similar to these
self-organized systems than they are to more linear systems
of the type Newton explored (see essays in Scott 1989; and
Krohn, Kuppers, and Nowotny 1990).
Of particular importance to the subject of this
chapter is the argument that human reasoning displays the
essential traits of such systems.

Stadler and Kruse (1990)

identify a fundamental paradox which is inherent in
psychological research cast within the Newtonian paradigm;
psychological awareness seems to be much greater than
individual experience can account for (151-52).

They

continue with a demonstration of how a Gestalt theoretical
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framework provides resolutions to this paradox.

Noteworthy

is the striking similarity between Gestalt descriptions of
mental phenomena and descriptions of other phenomena now
described as self-organized: "Confronted with this immanent
obstinacy, Gestalt theory has identified a number of
fundamental principles of order formation in the cognitive
system which anticipate in detail some of the concepts
developed in the theory of complex non linear systems"
(182).

Given this general observation along with our

inability to adequately explain systems of political
belief, exploration of the similarities between the selforganizational paradigm and current knowledge about
political belief systems seems a worthwhile endeavor.
One general characteristic of a self-organized system
is that relationships within the system are non-causal.
Nevertheless, there remains an order to such systems.

This

is possible in situations where multiple outcomes are
consistent with identical conditions.
+ X3 => Ylf or =>Y2.

For example, X 1 + X2

This transformation in

conceptualization requires an appropriate change in the
language used to describe the activity of such systems.

It

has been suggested that Toynbee's historical construct
"challenge and response"

is a more accurate description of

the observed reality than is cause and effect.

That is,

environments provide challenges to which multiple responses
are possible.

For self-organized systems, it is impossible
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to say which response will occur in any given case (Scott
1989, 3-9) .
There are, however, two characteristics of the
responses. One, the possibilities are greatly restricted.
In the language of self-organization, only certain
possibilities will be consistent with the system's own
history.

And two, examination of a series of responses

will reveal a pattern.

The pattern which emerges, as well

as the number of cases which must be considered for the
pattern to emerge, are system dependent.

The pattern is

the empirical manifestation of self-organization and is
often referred to as an "attractor."

It reveals the

presence of something inside the system directing its
development (Scott 1989, 10-14).
Thinking of political belief systems in these terms
leads to a major change in approach to their study.

In the

study of political reasoning, the equivalent of causal
thinking is to begin with assumptions about which policy
positions logically go together.

The analyst begins with

assumptions about "what goes with what" as regards
political opinions.

Numerous scholars, however, have

identified problems with this approach to relationships
between political opinions.

Brown (1970), for example,

points out that researchers should not "employ their own
logic to determine which items 'logically go together'"
(67; see also Grafstein 1990).

The implication here is
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that logic is not the cognitive equivalent of gravityholding belief systems in rigid and universal patterns.
Even factor analysis, which explores whether people share
"what goes with what" beliefs, is known to be problematic.
It reveals only shared structures, not necessary ones
(Conover and Feldman 1980).
Thus, sensitive appraisal of political cognition has
revealed that it is not subject to the determinative forces
of solar systems.

Despite these objections, however,

analysts have continued to utilize constructs such as
labeling liberal and conservative positions on issues,
perhaps in the absence of any better methods of analysis.
If there is reason to believe that a self-organized
approach is appropriate, however, this paradigm may suggest
alternatives.
A second characteristic of self-organized systems
follows directly from the first and is also consistent with
previous observations about political belief systems.

This

characteristic is complexity: "complexity is recognized as
a genuine phenomena that does not lend itself to being
reduced to something simple or being explained by the
'overlapping' of simple elements"
Nowotny 1990, 6).

(Krohn, Kuppers, and

In other words, the whole system is

greater than the sum of its parts.

This occurs as the

various parts provide the context for each other.

For

example, the activities of a single ant make no sense
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outside of the context of the colony, neither do the
particular activities of various groups of ants.

Only

within the framework of the entire system can any piece be
seen as contributing to survival.

Or to use an equation

model again as an example, all independent variables in a
self-organized system are interactive.

If the American

political process is thought of as such a system, the
impact of being a woman on behavior within that process
should be dependent on her race.

The impact of being a

black woman should depend on her class, and so forth.
Converse (1964) discovered that mass belief systems
were far more complex than his concept of them could
explain.

Subsequent, research has attempted to provide

theories capable of explaining this complexity and
succeeded only in demonstrating that the complexity
increases faster than theories attempting to explain it.
Witness the number of factors which are now believed to be
pertinent to the belief system: groups, culture, core
values, ideology, etc.

The impact of these factors seems

not to be uniform; different people resolve different
issues in different ways.

In other words, the influence of

any single factor seems to be dependent on context, and no
single model captures the belief system phenomena.

Thus,

there is further indication that the self-organization
framework may be relevant to belief system analysis.
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This complexity along with the indeterminate nature of
internal relationships leads to a third observation on
self-organized systems: they are not systems in a
conventional sense.

"The classical system-environment

model according to which the adaption of a system to its
environment is controlled externally and according to which
the adaption of the system occurs in the course of learning
process, is replaced by a model of systemic closure"
(Krohn, Kuppers, and Nowotny 1990, 6).

In conventional

analysis of social systems, outputs were believed to be
explainable in terms of inputs.

In many cases the system

itself was accepted as a "black box" which was assumed to
be a constant factor in all similar systems.

For many

systems, however, complexity and indeterminacy make output
predictions impossible.

Removing black box assumptions

from traditional systems analysis would leave researchers
with very little to say.
But the proposition that these systems are selforganized raises a new set of questions and provides a new
framework for analysis.

One of the areas of interest in

these systems is the internal phenomena: "What are the
mechanisms by which the system maintains itself and
responds to the environment?" "What is revealed in the
system's history which will give clues about how it will
answer challenges?"

Such questions get at the heart of the

existence of self-organized systems.

Therefore,

"system
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closure" does not mean that the system is impervious to its
environment; energy and information certainly must enter
and exit.

However, the system itself is believed to

control the acceptance and use of this energy and
information.

The interesting question, then, becomes "how

does the system make these decisions?"
Among the most extensive efforts to apply traditional
systems analysis to systems of political belief is that of
Robert Lane (1973),

In reworking the theory to apply it to

the observed complexity of belief systems, Lane describes a
phenomena similar to a self-organized system.

He

recognizes, for example, that living systems have a
property of agency.

In other words, they are not

programmed but rather actively make decisions.

The bases

for making these decisions, that is the internal dynamics
of such a system, need to be included in analysis.
Furthermore, this internal reality is generated by the
system's past experience and mediates between inputs and
outputs.

Consequently, Lane argues, there are limits on

the impact of feedback loops and, therefore, on the
functional approach to an analysis of belief systems (9196) .
Any inquiry such as Converse's (that is, an
inquiry about the relationship between various
political ideas) is in my view, at least partly
an inquiry into political reasoning and therefore
requires an analysis of the ways in which people
think about politics.
In order to do this
analysis, one must examine the thinking and
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reasoning processes as well as the patterns of
association they produce (98).
The general character of self-organized systems gives
us one more clue as to the nature of the internal reality.
The study of these entities has led to the observation:
11irregularity of nature is not treated as an anomaly but
becomes the focus of research and thus is declared to be
normal.

One looks for regularity within irregularity.

Non-Equilibrium processes are recognized as the source of
order and the search for equilibrium is replaced by the
dynamics of processes"
7).

(Krohn, Kuppers, and Nowotny 1990,

Such systems, then, are similar not to the extent to

which they appear to be on the surface, but according to
similarities in the processes which maintain their
stability.

In the language discussed above, two chaotic

systems may respond to their environments in very different
ways, but their responses may be governed by the same
internal process.

Thus vast degrees of superficial

variation are possible because of the sensitivity of the
internal processes to a host of contextual considerations
and the complexity this generates.

Nevertheless, this does

not indicate that the individual systems are not governed
by the same process.
In a social science context this ideas has been
observed and expressed by Geertz:

"Looking at the ordinary

in places where it takes unaccustomed forms brings out not,
as has often been claimed, the arbitrariness of human

behavior... but the degree to which its meaning varies
according to the pattern of life by which it is informed
(1973, 14).

This conclusion was derived from observation

of cultures, not from system theory.

In a belief system

context, our gaze is drawn sharply back to Converse's
discovery of diversity in public opinion:

"a realistic

picture of political belief systems in the mass public,
then, is not one that omits issues and policy demands
completely nor one that presumes widespread ideological
coherence; it is rather one that captures with some
fidelity the fragmentation, narrowness, and diversity of
these demands"

(1964, 247).

Efforts to explain this

observation using constructs such as levels of
conceptualization are not overly meaningful;

this only

makes a distinction between people whose opinions do not
appear to be arbitrary and those whose opinions do.

In

contrast, the self-organized system theory suggests that
"fragmentation, narrowness, and diversity" may conceal
"patterns of life" or "dynamics of processes."
Taken as a whole, the literature on belief systems
gives us reason to believe that a self-organized framework
should be brought to bear on their analysis.

If this is

done, appropriate changes in the goals of research are also
necessary.

It must be recognized that numerous outcomes

are consistent with any possible set of factors on which we
choose to focus.

Consequently, consistency between system

history and response to challenges rather than between
stimulus and response should be explored.

The dynamic

processes of cognition itself should become an important
object of investigation.

Of particular interest are

processes which, though very complex, i.e., wrought with
context, and non-causal are capable of generating order
within the individual belief system.

(Order, here,

indicates non-arbitrary responses.)

At the macro or

collective level, however, the irregular pattern of beliefs
which has been regularly observed in American public
opinion is consistent with expectations.

The suggestion that stories are common in political
cognition, however, was derived from attribution literature
which is generally consistent with a Newtonian paradigm
(see especially Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1990 on
"causal chains of reasoning").

Tracing the implications of

this suggestion, though, led to the complex, indeterminate,
evolving view of belief systems portrayed at the conclusion
of chapter two.

At this point, it is clear that, by

coincidence or miracle (or self-organization), complex,
indeterminate, and evolving looks like self-organization.
All of the arrows of previous research are pointing in the
same direction; Converse, Sniderman, Conover, Lane have all
been looking at a self-organized system but not recognizing
it as such.
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What then is the role of myths and other narratives in
a belief system so conceived?

To this point, in the

analysis, narratives have been discussed as fixed entities.
They are not, however, without their own dynamics.

It is

now appropriate to consider the nature of narrative
processes.

The following paragraphs describe narratives as

processes themselves, as part larger cognitive processes,
and all of these as organizational processes falling within
the parameters of self-organized systems.

This discussion

begins with a more full explication of the reasons for
expecting stories to be common elements of political
reasoning.
The first observation to be made is that the story is
the form of our social experience.

That is we observe an

intricate and complex web of human interaction even within
our own limited, personal experience.

Consequently, the

story form is intimately familiar, being part of our dayto-day encounters with real people such as neighbors and
co-workers.

We notice that the people we meet have

peculiar personality traits which produce patterns in their
behavior.

Responses to this behavior by others are in turn

influenced by their own personality traits.
It follows from this first point that it would be
reasonable and most parsimonious to simply internalize this
form in our memories.

In fact storing the isolated

elements of our observations would seem very difficult.
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This is one of the points on which schema theory has been
attacked by its critics.

A series of objects linked only

by spatial or temporal proximity lack context,
verisimilitude, and ignore issue like "the coordination and
integration of schemas, necessary to solving novel
problems"

(Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland 1991, 1343-1346;

quote on page 1346).

By adding elements such as plot, the

story form provides context, verisimilitude, coordination,
and integration.

Its ability to respond to novel

situations will be discussed below.
Another observation to be made is that narrative
functions as a form of discourse.

Given the discussion

above, it should be a common form of discourse.

Thus,

information often comes to us from others in the same form
as directly from experience.

Of importance for belief

system research is one particular case of such
communication.

Through stories, the memory of experience

may survive far longer than the individual or individuals
who have an experience; that is, stories become histories.
Such stories can become links between people spanning space
and time.

These histories become particularly poignant

when the experience itself is repeated.

In such cases,

stories begin to define group identity.
These are a few reasons for expecting that attribution
theory is on the right track in portraying the narrative
form of political cognition.

They show that the narrative
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form should indeed be an integral aspect of cognition.

The

potential relationship between narratives and belief
systems needs to be examined more directly, however.
Step number one in political cognition is some act of
simplification.

The simplicity of the basic narrative form

is evidenced by a plethora of stories which fascinate
children, and many of the biblical stories which provide
the foundation for Western social values.

In addition,

given the basic structure, filling in missing information
or generalizing from a small amount of information is a
rather simple act.

The desert heuristic is again

indicative; policy opinions potentially affecting millions
are arrived at by substituting entire social classes in
place of a small number of observed individuals.

Thus the

story is itself basically simple but can play an important
role in integrating the complexities of reality.
Despite this simplicity, in fact because of it,
possible permutations of the form are practically infinite.
This is in part because of the various elements of a story
which may or may not be present.

In fact, the potential

elements of the narrative form are all of the elements of
life.

Any organizational foundation of political cognition

must be capable of incorporating all of the elements of
human experience.

Narratives do possess the potential to

integrate all aspects of life generally and politics
specifically: people, personalities, actions, inter
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actions, reactions, emotions, desires, goals, physical and
psychological settings, fact and fantasy.

Two additional

points on this issue are worth noting.
One of the difficulties which the belief system
literature has faced is distinguishing cognition from
affect.

The attempt to do so is grounded in the assumption

that reasoning is an abstracted, logical process and
emotion and feelings are separate, irrational realities.
The story form, however, can and usually does hold these
two elements of social experience tightly together.
the desert heuristic is instructive.

Again

It provides a

rational framework for arranging information, and deeply
embedded within the framework are the emotional responses
which call for a course of action.
A second point is also a response to other literature.
In their recent work Cultural Theory, Thompson, Ellis, and
Wildavsky (1990) suggest that there are five possible ways
of life and offer a "typology of surprise" which explains
movement by an individual from one to the other (69-81) .
In this typology, observations at odds with the accepted
order of the universe accumulate in the memory in an
additive fashion.

Eventually the evidence against a way of

life may be greater than the evidence for it and the
individual will "jump" to an alternative vision.

Given the

fundamental place of these ways of life within the
political consciousness, however, such a shift should be
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rather existentially disturbing.

Consequently, ways of

life may find some way to be a little less passive, a
little more defensive.

A mechanism for this self defense

is possible if ways of life exist in narrative form.
Stories not only can recognize, they actively define and
create a place for deviance.

In this way, entire classes

of human activity can be relegated to the marginal state of
'exception' and thereby not generally offer a threat to the
core narrative of the political consciousness.
An image of the importance of the narrative form to a
self-organized belief system is beginning to emerge.
Narrative can accommodate a great deal of complexity.

The

form can structure a tremendous amount of information in
such a way that each element provides context for all of
the others.

This internal complexity creates a great deal

of external variation.

It has also been shown that the

story is able to maintain the systems history, be that
history unique and personal, or shared and collective.

To

this point, however, narrative has only been considered as
a form or structure; this has been done to simplify the
discussion.

But narratives are not rigid entities.

They

are in fact processes as well as the foundational unit of a
complex of processes which may well generate the
organization of systems of political beliefs.
Narratives as dynamic entities incorporate a process
of unfolding and discovery.

Whether being created, told,
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or heard, dramatic tension in search of resolution is at
the heart of the power of narrative.

They flow from a set

of initial conditions (a beginning) through particular
situations (a middle) to a conclusion (an end).

And the

conclusion may well become part of the initial conditions
for another story.

Each story is not only*a process but in

the process of breeding other stories.
Furthermore, stories do not only grow from the
conclusions of other stories, but may evolve as complex
nests of stories.

A group of narratives may only have

meaning within the context of a larger story.

In other

words, narratives can exist at various levels of
abstraction.

Here, then, is an indication of the

importance of myths within cognition.

Myths function as

meta-narratives providing a cosmological context for more
mundane narratives (Auerbach 1953).

Greek tragedies and

epics would probably not have been created outside of the
context of ancient notions of the relationships between
gods, mankind, and society.

The same is true of Abraham's

sacrifice of Isaac outside the more general history of the
relationship of Yahweh and his people.

Or to offer an

example closer to home, the "invisible hand" is clearly a
product of an "Enlightened" mentality.
Stories can also serve as the interpretive bases of
other stories.

In recent years, the importance of personal

histories in various approaches to literary analysis has

85
also become clear.

Stories of sexual oppression, for

example, have become the foundation for feminist literary
criticism.

This point is crucial in an exploration of the

political belief system.

The stories of the individual

system must provide standards of evaluation of external
world, particularly of policy opinions; stories such as the
desert heuristic generally do serve this function.
Further, narratives are rationally coherent but not
logically deterministic.

Any story may develop in a

variety of different directions all consistent with its own
past and evolving circumstances.

Numerous conclusions are

often consistent with a single set of circumstances (For an
explicit example of this general possibility see Fowles
1969).

This is an important element of the challenge and

response dynamics of any self-organized system.
Another aspect of narrative which makes them likely
foundations of self-organized cognition is that they allow
for increases, even sudden and dramatic increases, in
complexity.

New information and experiences can be

assimilated into existing stories without changing their
fundamental nature.

The narrative is broadened to

integrate new discoveries with old.

This does not imply

that any experience can be made to fit within the context
of any narrative; stories may need to abandoned or
replaced.

Eventually, deviance may become the rule and

something like the typology of surprise will apply.

The
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implication is, however, that there is no internal limit to
the complexity which can be incorporated by the narrative
process.

In this way, narrative processes may be common to

belief systems of people at any point on the levels of
conceptualization scale; irregularity is not a sign of
arbitrariness.
However, though a narrative based belief system is
subject to change, it is not ephemeral.

The other argument

for the importance of narratives within the political
belief system is their stability.

The organizing principle

of any self-organized system must provide for states of
temporary equilibrium; this is how they are recognized as
organized (Scott 1989, 9) .

Stories can indeed exist as

finished products until the environment requires them to
respond to new challenges.

In fact, this approach suggests

a reality closer to that described by Thompson, Ellis, and
Wildavsky; one in which the dualism between stability and
change should be abandoned altogether:

"a theory of change

must also be a theory of stability... this dualism obscures
the enormous amount of change that is required to secure
stability"

(1990, 22).

A myth based theory of belief

system is a theory of stability and change.

In order to

express these aspects of narrative, a new term will be used
throughout the remainder of this dissertation.

Narrative

will be referred to as a form/process indicating the entire
complex of mental activity which has been described here.
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Summarizing the observations of the previous two chapters
will bring together the elements of the theory of myth
based self-organized belief systems.

Attribution research

presents some evidence of the presence of stories in
political reasoning and policy evaluation.

Recognizing the

hierarchical arrangement of belief systems, I suggested the
importance of core narratives.

Chapter three demonstrated

that the social science concept most similar to core
narrative, myth, is indeed theoretically compatible with
conventional notions of belief system.

Having suggested

the possibility of myth based beliefs, I inquired into the
nature of system as it pertains to political opinions.

It

was argued on the grounds of previous observation that
systems of political belief display the properties of self
organization.

And within this type of system, narrative is

at the heart of its dynamic processes.
As it has been developed thus far, the theory is
perhaps best conceptualized as one in which the belief
system consists of narrative layers.

At the bottom of each

individual belief system is a myth which is also the
foundation of the belief systems of most people in a
society.

The second layer consists of somewhat less

abstract narratives which are shared with a substantial
subset of the society.
at this level.

Something like ideology may exist

Movement up through these layers is

movement through stories which become more concrete and
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more unique to the individual.

At the top of the scale are

purely personal experiences which have influenced the
persons attitudes.
This image depicts how myth functions as a foundation
for both the individual and the mass belief system:
individuals are integrated into societies by myths.

As

also revealed by this representation, the theory can
explain similarities and differences between individuals.
Since each individual belief system has common and unique
elements, a tremendous degree of variation in how policy
opinions cluster together is expected.

The power of the

theory lies in the fact that this variation is explained as
the product of various narratives, not as a result of
different reasoning processes or of irrationality.
Other factors of myth based belief systems, however,
are not captured by the layer image.
importance of context.

One factor is the

Though a myth may be a common

element within many belief systems, its role in any
individual belief system will be influenced by other
elements of the belief system.

For example, one's

understanding of liberalism will be influenced by personal
encounters with society, and interpretations of encounters
with society will be influenced by liberalism.

Thus, as is

typical of self-organized systems, the belief system is
expected to be greater than the sum of various narrative
elements.

A second factor not included is time.

Because myths

and other cognitive narratives are part and parcel to
empirical experience, any or all aspects of the belief
system might change as a consequence of daily encounters
with the world.

Individual elements of the belief system

may even evolve as a product of reevaluation within the
context of other elements.

However, though a myth-based

belief system is subject to change, they are not ephemeral.
The other argument for the importance of narratives within
the political belief system is their stability.

Thus the

image described here is a useful picture of a belief system
but only at a particular point in time.

CHAPTER IV
THE LITERATURE RECONSIDERED

Though a fairly elaborate conceptualization of systems
of political belief has now been developed, one of the
major objectives of this dissertation has not been
achieved: the proposition made in the introduction that
this theory resolves the anomalies of previous research
(Bennett 1977) has yet to be supported.

Though this

literature has been cited as support for the current
theory, the observations of others have been
unsystematically cited as needed.

Following a Lakatosian

vision of scientific progress, the theory has been
constructed from a large number of observations.

However,

there has been no systematic analysis of the relationship
between theoretical approaches.

This chapter fashions an

answer to the question of integration of previous theories.
Beyond demonstrating theoretical linkages, this
chapter will also serve another purpose.

As Thompson and

his colleagues have pointed out, developing theory is not
sufficient, communicating it effectively is also essential.
To this end, it is important to understand how the present
theory is an addition to, and not a radical break from,
previous ones (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1991, 103).
Consequently, careful consideration of stability and change
in theoretical development should clarify the issues which
have been raised in this dissertation.
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This goal establishes the method of procedure.

Each

of the theoretical frameworks for the study of belief
systems presented in chapter one must again be considered
independently.

The interest here, however, will be in

their general characteristics, not in subtle arguments of
definition and measurement.

Each can then be compared to

the theory of myth based belief systems.

The first theory to be discussed is political culture, in
part because of its apparent similarity to myth.

In the

example of a myth discussed in chapter two, I suggested
that liberalism, usually described as the American culture,
actually exists and functions as a myth.

It is important,

therefore, to understand the similarities and differences
between the concepts.
In general, the theory of myth based belief systems
adds to the concept of culture a form/process, namely
narrative.

As Devine (1972) points out, the place where

culture lives is in the minds of individuals; thus, culture
is understood to be comprised of elements of cognition.
For reasons outlined above, we can expect these elements to
be held together by stories.

The important elements

themselves: identity, rules, symbols, and beliefs, are
expected to be the same for both theories.
Further comparison of the two theories must focus on
the Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1991) treatment of
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cultural theory.

Prior to this work, a host of limitations

could be cited regarding political culture: its inability
to explain change and its failure to incorporate
experience, depending instead on a more purely sociological
explanation of culture's origin and communication.
However, as has been seen above, the most recent
exploration of this subject has made great strides in
overcoming these limitations.

This theory of political

culture integrates reason and affect, stability and change,
experience and socialization.
Despite these advances, the most limiting element of
this theory is in fact the result of its dualistic
foundation.

Cultural Theory argues for the existence of

exactly five ways of life.

The number five is derived from

an initial schematic borrowed from Mary Douglas.

This

schematic consists of two intersecting dimensions of social
arrangement.

One of them is the "Grid" dimension which

"denotes the degree to which an individual's life is
circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions"

(5).

At

opposite ends of this dimension are social control and
autonomy.
dualistic.

The other of the two dimensions is equally
Implied in this picture is the notion that

ideas such as autonomy and social control have meaning in
and of themselves; social scientific meanings which hold
true regardless of context.

The theoretical limitation of

this view can be demonstrated with an example.

Consider
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the placement of zoon politicon: the belief that human
beings are political animals who find true freedom and
fulfillment only within the confines of their fellow
creatures.

Such a vision of humanity clouds the

distinction between autonomy and social control.
In contrast, consider the theory proposed in this
dissertation which suggests that the only thing permanent
is the narrative form/process.

As the term is described

above, one role of myth is precisely the defining of terms
like autonomy and social control.

Thus zoon politicon is

seen as the foundation of an exemplary core narrative on
which social relations can be described and prescribed.
The theory of myth based political beliefs, then, may be
less neat in its predictions but is more powerful,
explaining more variation with a more parsimonious theory.
In this light, a point made above can be expanded.
Myths are more subtle and adaptable than are ways of life.
Indeed ways of life are not themselves adaptable at all;
people move between possibilities, but the possibilities
are fixed.

Thus the importance of the typology of

surprise, of sudden jumps, can again be questioned.

Not

only does the narrative form/process incorporate deviance,
the malleability of narratives themselves provides a more
satisfying integration of stability and change.
In pointing out these considerations, however, it is
important not to overlook the contribution which the
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political culture literature makes to understanding the
role of myths in political beliefs.

Myths do provide a

mental map of the world, they do define goals and
preferences, and they do influence perceptions and social
interaction.

Thus pointing out the importance of myths

does not replace the concept of culture but improves upon
it by giving it more substance.

The next step is a closer look at the relationship between
myth and ideology.

As Halpern (1961) provides an excellent

treatment of precisely this question, this discussion
begins with his conclusions about similarities and
differences between the concepts.

This will be followed by

a discussion of the degree to which observations by
political scientists studying belief systems are consistent
with Halpern's explication.
Halpern begins with an exploration of the common
ground of myth and ideology, as they refer to such similar
phenomena, and then discusses the factors which distinguish
them from each other.

Both terms imply "generally though

tacitly understood principles of historical knowledge"
(129).

Going on to expand on this observation, Halpern

argues that both terms are historical in two senses:
"Myths" and "ideologies" are major and not
trivial concretions of the symbols accumulated in
culture over generations; that is, by definition,
they weigh enough in the balance of history to be
remembered and to exert their effects from one
generation to the next. Also, "ideology"
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necessarily implies "other ideologies" with which
it is in dynamic relations; and the same is true,
in its own way, of "myth" (131) .
However, myth and ideology differ in both origin and
function.

Myths have their origin in experience which is

then distorted by prelogical thought processes.
Ideologies, in contrast, arise from "particular situations
of social conflict or competition"

(135).

Other myths,

then, are understood to be myths of people at other times
and in other places while other ideologies can exist for
people in the same time and place but who are in
competition for social goods (136).

Just as all opposites

are fundamentally the same thing, black and white are both
colors, polar ideologies should share a common myth
foundation.

Halpern summarizes these findings:

1) The study of myths is the study of the origin
of beliefs out of historical experience. The
study of ideology is a study of the molding of
beliefs by social situations. 2) The social
function of myth is to bind together social
groups as wholes or, in other words, to establish
a social consensus. The social function of
ideology is to segregate and serve special
interests within societies in competition of
debate (137) .
Several points can now be made by examining belief
system research in this light.

Many of the observations

made by Converse and his followers indicate the validity of
Halpern's arguments.
The classic ideological approach to the study of
political belief requires the translation of an ideology
into specific issue positions.

This step is not itself a
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problem; the analyst can specify that one group of people
in a given situation should have these interests and
another group another set.

One particular cluster of

opinions can be identified as a manifestation of a
11conservative" ideology and another as "liberal."

The

meaning of a continuum between the two, however, is
problematic.

Consider two hypothetical individuals, for

example, one is "liberal" on three issues and
"conservative" on three issues.

The other individual holds

the exact opposite views being "liberal" on the three
issues on which the first is "conservative" and vise versa.
The ideology continuum fails to distinguish between these
two individuals.

The same is true of any internal point on

the continuum.
A more sophisticated view of the phenomena arises when
it is recognized that multiple ideologies may be built upon
a single myth foundation.

What is important is the

relative position of groups within the society regarding
various social goods.

And as policies deal with

distribution of social goods, numerous opinion clusters are
possible.

From this point of view,

"liberal" may be an

ideology, and "conservative" its logical opposite, but the
two individuals described above may also exemplify
ideologies.
In the ideology school of belief system research, it
is generally accepted that socialization is the origin of
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ideology.

Halpern, however, has clarified the importance

of experience and situation in addition to socialization.
Not only does this explain greater ideological variation,
it gives a clue as to why ideological reasoning, as
described by Converse and his followers, has proven to be
peculiar to elites.
the scale.

Consider in isolation the two ends of

As it happens both ends of the scale consist

primarily of answers to the question "what should elites do
for non elites, i.e. for women, for minorities, for the
poor, for those who need education?"

In Halpern's

language, there is a tremendous similarity of situation in
the very question.

Both ideologies evidence an elite

perspective; both "liberals" and "conservatives" see the
fundamental political relationship in our society as the
one between elites and the masses.

It does not seem such a

surprise, then, that this way of thinking is foreign to the
experience and. situation of most Americans.
What is not foreign to the experience of these and
most other Americans is the myth of liberalism.

Chapter

two argued that liberalism may function as a myth and that
there is substantial evidence of its import throughout
American political history.
arises,

Consequently, the question

"Is their evidence that liberalism, an example of

myth, and "liberal" and "conservative," examples of polar
ideologies, co-exist as Halpern predicts they would?"
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If Halpern is correct, there should be evidence
indicating that liberalism is a common foundation for these
two ideologies; liberalism the myth should be the
prelogical expression of experience which unites both
groups of people, while the ideologies divide people
according to their situation within society.

As it

happens, McClosky and Zaller (1984) demonstrate the former,
labeling the values which are common to most elites
"ethos".

(Ethos relates to myth just as culture does.

Ethos and myth are not completely different entities, myth
simply implies a form/process in which the ethos exists in
the minds of individuals.)

And Shingles (1989)

demonstrates the differences of situation among elites
labeling them high class and high status.
The importance of myths within individual and
collective belief systems raises a question about myth
conflict in a heterogeneous society such as ours.
According to the literature on myth, it may be difficult
for people with different core narratives to communicate
and find compromises.

Conflict between myths, therefore,

may become a defining characteristic of fundamental
political struggles within a society.

In the American

context, the liberal myth does not account for a master
slave relationship.

And if the master slave relationship

has remained a myth within the black community, there is
reason to believe that racial issues would become central
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to political discourse and belief systems.

Carmines and

Stimson (1982) demonstrate that this is exactly what
happened in the early 1960s.

If ideological conflict is

conflict between the two poles of a single dimension, race
conflict in our society has been conflict between
dimensions.

Policies such as affirmative-action hiring

quotas, which are usually inconsistent with the myth of
liberalism in almost any ideological form, are indications
of the nature of this conflict.
In contrast to the concept of ideology based belief
systems, however, the theory of myth based belief system
does not establish a single standard for judging rational
cohesion.

Most of the ideology research begins with

assumptions about "what goes with what."

Specifically, the

liberal-conservative continuum is its foundation.

On this

point, a myth framework is more in keeping with the
observations of Grafstein (1990) and Brown (1970) who have
identified problems with any belief in rational coherence
in and of itself.
Finally, it is important to consider the general
observations on political reasoning made by both Nie and
Andersen (1974) and Carmines and Stimson (1982).
Regardless of how much increase in liberal-conservative
reasoning there may have been in the early 1960s, the main
points of both of these pieces of research are consistent
with the theory of myth based belief systems.

Due to its
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narrative form/process, public opinion should be somewhat
responsive both to events and to elite leadership.

Only-

sudden and radical change would be rare.
Despite the insights of Halpern and their obvious
utility in this analysis, it is important not to overstate
the case.

Myth, Halpern argues, is a product of experience

and ideology a consequence of situation.

But is not any

understanding of situation dependent on the experiences
which it generates?

Furthermore, there is reason to

believe that the narrative form/process is an essential
element of political reasoning throughout the entire
cognitive hierarchy, from myth to policy position.

Thus

while myth may consist of a prelogical expression, it
should not be seen as more or less rational than ideology.
Nevertheless, myth and ideology are useful labels of two
levels of the hierarchy

of systems of political belief,

and there is ample evidence that they can be analytically
distinguished.

The core values literature which suggests a hierarchical
structure for systems of political belief was one of the
foundations for the initial proposition that myth might be
relevant to this topic.

And throughout the dissertation an

image of hierarchy has been maintained.
two theories are certainly compatible.

Consequently, the
Examining this
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compatibility more closely, however, will demonstrate the
superiority of recognizing the importance of narratives.
Recall, first, the Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) argument
that "a paucity of information does not impede structure
and consistency, it motivates the development and
employment of structure"

(1114).

It is also clear that

simplification of the external world is one of the prime
functions of myth, and that the narrative form generally is
adept at dealing with missing information.

Thus on the

issue of handling complexity, these are two complimentary
explanations offering a structure and a form/process.
The core values literature, however, leaves us with
some questions.

The most important of these regards the

actual existence of the values in individual cognition.
Are isolated, abstract concepts, such as freedom, the
foundational elements of our political reasoning and
evaluations?

Or do these values exist in some context?

One argument that myths provide the context for core values
can be drawn directly from the observations of Hurwitz and
Peffley.

A hierarchy of values is certainly a more simple

arrangement than an egalitarian plane of values, but a
hierarchy of values held together by narratives is more
simple still.

Recall that narrative is the form in which

we encounter the social world; memory and evaluation, then,
should be facilitated by internalizing this form.
like freedom must have meaning, stories about heros

Concepts
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struggling for liberation from oppressors, for example,
give them meaning.
The theory of myth based belief systems also
incorporates observations regarding the importance of
religious beliefs.

In this language, liberalism and

Christianity are simply two different meta-narratives which
provide meaning and prescription for social interaction.
It has also been suggested that the narratives of political
reasoning are not isolated entities but a complex of
interrelated elements.

Consequently, religious values,

when they are adhered to by individuals, should be integral
factors in a system of political belief.
It was observed in the review of the literature in
chapter one that one of the major contributions of the core
values research to the study of belief systems was an
integration of sociological and psychological approaches.
A theory built on myth maintains this important linkage.
Myths maintain order and consistency at both the individual
and collective level.

Thus this theory improves upon its

predecessor without sacrificing the insights gained from
core values analysis.
In chapter one, it was also demonstrated that the core
values literature and the social group explanations are not
mutually exclusive.

This became particularly apparent in

studies of religious groups (Leege and Welch 1989; Wald,
Owen, and Hill 1990) where shared values were seen as
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contributing to group identity and to evaluations of
others.

There is now reason to believe that values are

held and shared in narrative form and that groups are often
the characters in these stories.
Myth's role in social group identity is one of
definition.

Just as myths describe the nature of social

relationships such as control and autonomy, so too do they
define "who" it is that is relating.

As described by those

who have studied them closely, myths unite people of common
experience (Halpern 1961; Geertz 1973).

This is so because

common experience is rendered by common myths.

Thus myths

are responsible for the very experience of group identity.
If there were no shared account of shared bits of reality,
there would be no group.
It has also been pointed out that the narrative
form/process is capable of containing all of the factors of
experience within itself.

Thus, myths would be able to

portray not only the groups of which we are members but
also the "other" groups.

Furthermore, expectations about

interaction between the groups would be included in the
plot of the myth.

For example, the same myth which defines

Americans for themselves may well define the Russians or
some other enemies; enemies can be seen as simply the
opposite of whatever we think we are.

In making these

definitions, a myth would also entail the perceived
relationship between the two.

In this way, the theory of

104
myth based belief systems establishes a common foundation
for both the psychological identity and the attribution
phenomena which have been described and observed.
As a rule the proposed importance of myths provides a
somewhat broader theoretical perspective on the belief
system phenomenon than either the group identity or the
attribution approach.

Consequently, previous analysis

guided by either of these approaches is valid despite the
proposed change.

The following examples demonstrate how a

few previous studies are consistent with a myth framework.
The work of Conover (1980) and Sigelman and Knight
(1985) indicates that individuals are evaluated in the same
way as policies, that is by attribution of characteristics.
This observation is consistent with expectations as
individuals play the same role in the narrative
form/process as do groups of them.

The factors which

emerge in the Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth (1991) analysis
may well indicate the existence of several myths within
American society.

Though factors do not necessarily reveal

the way any individual actually thinks, the strength of
these factors indicate some shared perceptions which unite
and divide American society. Finally, the work of Allen,
Dawson, and Brown (1989) is consistent with expectations
regarding myth maintenance.

Those who are more closely

tied to information coming from the group maintain closer
identity with the group.
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These few examples are fairly diverse in their
interests and in their theoretical approaches.
Nevertheless, they are all comprehensible by looking at the
underlying stories they reveal.

In this way, they

demonstrate the integrative capacities of the proposed
theory.
This search for an integrated theory began with the
observation that the black box approach of schema left many
questions unanswered.

Subsequently, it was argued that

belief systems display the characteristics of self
organization which gives further cause to be suspicious of
the black box approach.

By focusing on the internal

dynamics of belief systems, an integrative theory has been
developed.

Like schema theory, myth and the narrative

form/process bring together psychological factors such as
group identity, sociological factors like shared historical
experience, a hierarchical structure, and the importance of
memory in the interpretation of reality.

But, as has been

seen, the theory of myth based belief systems goes beyond
these and provides answers to questions of internal
coordination and evolution.
As the primary purpose of this dissertation has been
to respond to Bennett's call for a "general, integrative,
theory of mass beliefs"
should be made.

(1977, 473), one final observation

It now appears that the earlier theories

from which the present one has been constructed were not as

"divergent" as Bennett suggests.

From the perspective of

myth and the narrative form/process, these other approaches
differ only in emphasis.

They are not contradictory but

various pieces of a larger picture.

CHAPTER V
DATA COLLECTION

Chapters two and three of this dissertation blend
together several concepts.

Traditional notions of

political belief system are combined with the concept of
myth, the general narrative form, and the science of self
organization.

When considered together, these elements

create a theory which is applicable to many aspects of
political reasoning.

Chapter four demonstrates that this

theory does not supplant previous ones but is consistent
with them.

Being consistent with previous theories, the

theory of myth based belief systems is consistent with most
of the empirical findings derived from them.

This is not

to suggest that previous investigations prove the validity
of this theory, but rather that they might have, but do
not, establish evidence against various aspects of the
theory.

To the extent that previous empirical research is

relevant to the proposed theory at all, however, it is only
relevant to certain peripheral factors.
To conclude this dissertation, therefore, it is
important to include an exploration of the more central
elements of the theory as they are evident in real people.
The process of bringing together abstract ideas has proven
beneficial and enlightening.

However, as with myth, a

theory must constantly be compared to empirical experience.
This is the purpose of the next two chapters.
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For reasons discussed below, however, existing data
sets are insufficient for exploring the myth based belief
system.

This chapter lays out the method used to collect a

new data set, one which is guided by and more appropriate
to this theory.

The following chapter consists of the

analysis of this information.

This analysis should not be

interpreted as hypothesis testing, but might

more

accurately be described as a presentation of evidence and
examples.
The exploration of the central elements of a theory of
myth based belief systems requires "thick" data.

One of

the predictions which can be drawn from the theory
developed in this dissertation is that the context in which
political opinions exist is very important.

This theory

places more emphasis on context than most previousones
to the expected importance of system history
development.

due

and

Context can include the individual's personal

experience as it relates to an opinion, the opinions of
others, the values of the society, and many other factors.
In the process of political evaluation, these contextual
factors contribute to an image of "what is at stake"
(Zaller 1991), what is to be gained or lost if an issue is
decided a certain way or if a particular individual is
elected: lives, freedom, money, peace, order, etc.
As previous theories have not emphasized the
importance of context, the data collection guided by these
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theories has also been incomplete.

An assumption made in

most mass surveys is that the authors and the analysts of
the survey know the answers to questions like what is at
stake in a particular issue.

Consequently, most surveys

inquire only about where a person stands on a scale.

This

is a very useful technique for comparing people to each
other on an issue.

However, exploring rational coherence

of belief systems using such data is problematic.

For

example, if an analyst assumes that a person who is "prochoice" on abortion is interested in the right to privacy,
when in fact that person is primarily concerned about birth
rates among the poor, it will be very difficult to explain
how this opinion is rationally related to others.

By

contrast, an examination of that person's own explanation
of the opinion may well reveal a rational foundation for
what appears to be a wildly irregular pattern of belief.
And if belief systems are self-organized, this is exactly
the expectation; an examination of the dynamics of opinion
formation is essential.

To conclude, understanding

political opinions requires understanding the context in
which those opinions exist, and understanding the latter
requires inquiry, not assumption.

The only way to know why

people think what they think is to ask them why.
Thus, a survey was designed specifically for this
dissertation.

The development of the instrument was guided

by the following principles:

1) A fairly broad picture of

the respondent's belief system was a goal of the survey.
Consequently, a variety of political elements were
considered.

The elements included in this survey are a)

political persons, i.e., the recent presidential
candidates, b) contemporary political issues, and c) the
nature of American government itself, i.e., its role in and
responsiveness to society.

2) The respondents were offered

as much opportunity as possible to express their own
priorities.

What an individual thinks is important reveals

a great deal about that person's fundamental view of
society and politics.

This survey allows this type of

information to be revealed which makes analysis of the
structure of the overall belief system possible.

3) In

order to explore form of political reasoning and the
context in which opinions exist, discursive data is
necessary.

The researcher should not impose the reasoning

behind holding a particular belief.

To this end,

respondents were given opportunities to explain their own
attitudes in their own terms.

4) The theory of myth based

belief systems proposed above also suggests the importance
of experience.

Both personal and collective/historical

experience may be important.

The latter is expected to be

of particular relevance at the more abstract level of myth.
Therefore, the survey concludes with an inquiry into these
factors.

(See appendix A for complete instrument.)
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The sample for such an instrument is necessarily small
and, therefore, is not a representative slice of the
American population as a whole.

Consequently, the method

of selecting respondents and the composition of the
resulting sample may have critical effects on the
information collected by the instrument.

Thus, a detailed

discussion of these issues is appropriate.
One of the first factors considered in choosing
respondents was the indications of previous research that
there is a substantial portion of the population with
almost no attitudes of a type that political scientists
would consider political.

Of course this could be the

result of foreign notions about the locus of important
power relationships; that is, there could be ideas about
American politics which conventionally trained political
scientists do not recognize as such.

This possibility,

however, is theoretically distinct from the proposed theory
regarding how ideas fit together.

In an effort to avoid

trying to understand both what political ideas people do
have, along with how those ideas fit together, in a single,
preliminary survey, this survey concentrates only on ideas
and opinions of the conventional sort, that is, those
issues which are the concern of most contemporary political
rhetoric and of most public opinion surveys.
This limitation in scope of the instrument makes a
limitation in the potential respondent population
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necessary.

Previous research indicates that individuals on

the higher end of the levels of conceptualization scale are
more likely to have opinions on these issues.
Consequently, minimum standards of formal education and
political information were set for respondents.

A high

school degree and some higher education was set as the
education minimum, and completion of at least one college
level political science course was the minimum information
requirement.

For purely logistical reasons, the population

from which the sample was taken was students at Louisiana
State University.
In soliciting volunteers, an effort was made to
achieve some variation in the sample.
importance was racial variation.

Of particular

The theory of myth based

belief systems leads to the expectation that variation in
experience results in variation in political beliefs.
Throughout the history of the United States, the most stark
variation in the common experience of social groups has
been that between whites and blacks.

If there is contrast

between myths anywhere in American political belief
systems, it should be readily apparent here.

Also of

theoretical interest are religious differences.

Particular

individuals were recruited with these factors in mind.
Participants were selected by personal contact.

In

most cases, they were contacted individually by myself or a
colleague.

Each was asked if he or she would mind
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participating in an interview on their political opinions.
Potential respondents were told that the interview would
take about an hour of their time and that the interviews
were being conducted as part of a Ph.D. dissertation
project.

A second method of recruitment was via a general

announcement to a political science class providing the
same information and requesting participants.
method was there any mention of a reward.

In neither

None of the

students were in a class of mine at the time of the request
or of the interviews, so no grading advantage should have
been expected in any case.

Each individual was contacted a

second time to set up a precise time and place for the
interview.

Two potential respondents who had volunteered

could not be scheduled and were not interviewed.

No

respondents who were scheduled, however, missed the
appointment.
These selection procedures resulted in thirteen
respondents.
white.

Of these, four were black and nine were

There were four women and nine men.

Three were

over the age of 25, ranging in age from 3 0 to 65, with the
remainder being between the ages of 18 and 25.

All of them

met the minimum education and information requirements.
Eight of the respondents were recruited by individual
request while five responded to a general class
announcement.

It is interesting to note that this last

group of five included all three of the interviewees who
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were over the age of 25.

It should also be noted that the

sample can be described generally as "highly interested in
politics."

Several of them far exceeded the minimum

political information requirement having taken numerous
political science classes and, in some cases, been very
active in political campaigns.

In this and in their

education, they are rather an elite sample when compared to
Americans generally.
The interviews themselves were conducted between
December of 1992 and March of 1993.

Each was conducted

individually in a private room in an academic building
(Stubbs Hall) on the LSU campus.

Interviews were scheduled

with plenty of time in between them such that the
interviewees were not required to wait.

I was prepared and

waiting for each of them so that the interview began as
soon as possible.

To my knowledge, none of the respondents

knew each other, nor was there any interaction between
them.

In one case, a respondent was accompanied by a

friend who also sat in the room during the interview.
There was no verbal communication between the two during
the interview however.
All of the interviews were conducted by me in a face
to face position, in most cases across a table or desk, and
in a conversational tone.

After a brief discussion of a

greeting nature, all of the respondents but one were asked
if they objected to the interview being taped.

All of them
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said no.

(In at least two cases, however, there did seem

to be some anxiety on the part of the respondent, perhaps
partially as a consequence of being recorded.)

Except in

the one case that was not recorded, very few or no notes
were taken during the interview so as to avoid drawing
attention to particular responses.

And in that one case,

notes were being written continuously which also should
have avoided drawing attention to any particular answers.
After the tape recorder was turned on, the interviews
began with some introductory remarks.

(appendix B)

The

main purpose of these remarks was to remove as much of the
artificiality and inequality of an interview as possible.
To this end, questions and comments about the interview as
it progressed were encouraged, and the reasons for the
interview were explained.

These comments were also

intended to set the tone and pace for the interview.
After responding to any questions the participant had
about the interview, each was asked to sign a permission
slip.

(appendix C)

This permission was obtained pursuant

to the approval agreement granted by the Committee on the
Use of Humans and Animals as Research Subjects at Louisiana
State University.

(Copies of the application for approval

as well as the letter granting approval are available from
the author.)

None of the respondents declined to sign the

form, though one did reiterate his or her interest in
remaining anonymous several times.
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The general goals of the survey instrument are set out
above.

A few additional comments about the instrument and

the interviews, however, should be noted.
There was a great deal of variation in the
expressiveness of the respondents; interview length ranged
from 30 to 75 minutes.
range.

Most were at the low end of this

The interviews did not include a great deal of

effort to get respondents to go into more detail.

It

seemed most useful to let them talk when they had something
they wanted to say and stop when they did not want to go
on.

In nearly all cases, this produced a large number of

fairly brief responses with a few substantial ones offered
by each individual.

This information itself revealed a

great deal about the centrality of certain issues as well
as the centrality of politics generally in the person's
lif e .
The part of the interview I considered to be the
easiest was placed first.

This was the discussion of the

recent presidential election.

This did prove to be an item

that the respondents were comfortable discussing.

All

respondents had voted in the 1992 election and had very
solid reasons for doing so.

Further, they did not seem to

have a problem expressing what they thought an American
president's priorities should be.

All of them appeared to

have had similar discussions before and could express their
ideas.
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The discussion of particular issues was expected to be
and proved to be more difficult for some of them.

In some

cases, issues came up which the respondent seemed not to
have previously considered.

In many instances, respondents

were noticeably unsure of themselves.

More generally, the

difference in the logic of an interview versus the logic of
a normal conversation was also apparent.

Moving from one

topic to the next according to my discretion rather than
letting the discussion evolve proved to be an aggressive
and invasive method.

Respondents were never sure when they

were to be finished with one issue and had no way to
prepare for what came next.

The inequality between the

interviewer and the interviewee was apparent.

Despite all

efforts to the contrary, this approach truncated the normal
reasoning process, and responses, even on these open ended
questions, are directly contaminated by the method.
As a rule, racial and gender differences between the
interviewer and the respondents did not seem to have much
impact.

Black respondents and women seemed very open about

race and gender issues.

Black students in particular

seemed to have given a great deal of thought to differences
between the races in American society and were very willing
to discuss their conclusions.

On the other hand, either

because they had not thought about it much or for some
other reason, white respondents were often uncomfortable
discussing racial issues.

Generally, the issue being
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discussed seemed to have more impact on a respondents'
willingness to talk about it than characteristics of the
respondent.
The rational coherence of individual systems of
political belief has proven to be an elusive phenomena.

It

is, however, one of the main goals of belief system
research.

By integrating the elements structure,

form/process, and sources of content, the theory of myth
based belief systems offers a more complete explanation of
this coherence than any other single theory.

In doing so,

it provides the analyst of public opinion with a set of
clues or expectations which may lead to finding rational
coherence where none was visible before.

It also suggests

the nature of the information which is needed if coherence
is to be evident.

As described above, the intention of

this survey is the collection of information appropriate to
this task.

Examination of the data collected in this

survey is a search for coherence guided by the clues.

They

are:
1)
reasoning.

Narrative elements should be prevalent in political
A narrative is evident when the respondent

utilizes a character-plot form of discourse.

This is in

contrast to what might be considered more purely rational
discourse in forms such as "if...then..."

Public opinion

research grounded in attribution theory has demonstrated
the existence of the story in some specific political
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contexts.

Beyond attribution type narratives, others may

also be evident such as personal anecdotes; e.g.,

"I am in

favor of gun control because my brother was shot by a thief
with a cheap hand gun."
2) Such stories and beliefs should derive their
authority within the belief system from a single more
general vision of the nature of human beings, of
government, and of their interaction, i.e., a myth.

The

various elements of the system should be rationally
coherent within the context of this myth.

It is very

possible that the myth will be so firmly assumed that the
respondent does not articulate it.

A sensitive reading of

the individual's complete pattern of beliefs as expressed
in the survey may give the analyst insight into the nature
of the myth however.

If not, additional insight into the

myth at the core of any individual's political beliefs may
be aided by the next clue.
3) The particular stories of particular belief systems
should be related to experience.

Of importance here are

the collective historical experiences of the social group;
myths are not expected to change radically in response to
personal experience.

In this sample, then, evidence of

similarities within racial groups and differences between
them is expected.
4) As the coherence of systems of belief is not
expected to be generated by causal relationships, a one-to-
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one relationship between myth and the more concrete
elements of belief systems is not expected.

Thus people

who share a basic myth about American political
relationships may have voted for different presidential
candidates or evidence different patterns of policy
opinions.

Rather analysis must find that presidential and

policy evaluations are reasonable within the context of a
particular myth.
5)

The myths and narratives of political cognition are

not expected to exist or function as discreet packages.
The more appropriate metaphor is a web of interconnected
parts with each part providing context for the others.
Religious values, when present, have an important influence
on political beliefs.

Christianity in particular is known

to be an important element of the opinions of both white
and black Americans.

Thus religious persons should be

recognizably distinct from their secular counterparts.

Of

particular interest in this context is the interaction of
religious myths with the dominant social myths of the two
racial groups.
These interviews proved to be a very important
addition to the dissertation.
demonstrate the theory.

They provided examples which

As shall be seen in the next

chapter, though the theory is generally supported by the
data, some revision is necessary.

Furthermore, some
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additional findings which are consistent with the theory
but had not been anticipated can be added.
The limitations on the data, however, should be kept
in mind.

The respondents comprise an elite sample in terms

of education, political information, and professional
aspirations or accomplishments.

Future research must

attempt to escape this limitation.

Also, as noted above,

the interview artificially structures the data.

It is in

many ways exactly contradictory to the information
suggested by the theory in that responses are abstracted
from normal reasoning processes.

As such, the validity of

the information collected is dependent on the intentional
effort of each respondent to overcome this artificiality
and to try to answer each question as honestly as possible.
I believe that these thirteen people did a remarkable job
of trying to respond honestly, and consequently some very
interesting results were obtained.

CHAPTER VI
DATA ANALYSIS

The analysis of the data collected in the interviews
will be presented in two parts.

These two parts are

roughly parallel to the material presented in chapters two
and three.

The first part explores political beliefs at

the level of myth.

As expected, respondents did not

clearly articulate their fundamental views of human beings
and social interaction.

Taken collectively, however,

certain common beliefs can be extracted from the data.
Furthermore, there are indications that these common
beliefs exhibit the characteristics of myth.
The second part of this chapter focuses on the
reasoning process involved in the evaluation of issues.
There are indications in the data that the character/plot
form of reasoning is important at this more concrete level
also.

However, the layers of narrative structure described

at the end of chapter four does not appear to be accurate.
Rather, political reasoning seems to occur primarily at a
fairly constant level.

This level lies between the

abstract myth and concrete facts learned from experience.
In its narrative structure and level of abstraction, the
elements of this process are very similar to constructs
which have been referred to as heuristics. These heuristics
are the result of interpreting experience within the
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context of the shared myth and are the point at which
rational coherence is most apparent.

Liberal ideals are essential elements of the political
beliefs of the participants in these interviews.

As used

here, and as evidenced in the interviews, liberal ideals
include primary interest in personal autonomy and economic
prosperity.

The importance of such ideals was certainly to

be expected; as discussed previously, numerous earlier
studies describe the importance of liberal beliefs in
American politics generally and public opinion more
specifically.

The goal of the present study, however, is

not simply to confirm the presence of liberalism, but to
describe more fully its nature and function within a system
of political beliefs.

More to the point, the concern is

with whether liberalism is accurately described as a myth.
The goal of the first part of this chapter is to argue
that this is an accurate description according to the
evidence which exists in the survey responses.

This

argument will proceed by presenting evidence which
indicates that liberalism displays four important
characteristics of myth: it is shared by and unites a group
of people (Halpern 1961); it serves as a foundation for
evaluation thereby uniting the descriptive and the
prescriptive (Geertz 1973); it is comprised of characters
and actions and therefor its nature is narrative
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(Blumenburg 1985); and it is historical in the sense that
it survives through time (Halpern 1961).

However vividly respondents disagree on various issues,
there was a foundation shared by all of them.

Major

elements of this foundation included the perceived
importance of personal autonomy and economic matters.
Evidence of this is seen in respondents' thoughts on what
their priorities would be if they were president.

This

question was intended to ascertain ideas about what the
respondent thought was most important.

In addition to

revealing personal priorities, comparing answers
demonstrates that there is a great deal more similarity
than difference between most of those surveyed on these
fundamental beliefs.
The following examples are a list of first responses
to the question:
economic issues
let roe v wade stand; court more liberal;
economic; too many people unemployed; no way we should
import products and goods with so many Americans
unemployed
protecting business from undue regulation
disassemble some of the bureaucracy
line item veto; too much pork
A few of the respondents spoke primarily of education in
response to this question.

In all of these cases, however,
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this interest was also directly related to personal
autonomy and economic concerns.

The general belief was

that education is the way to improve a person's
competitiveness for jobs, thereby decreasing economic
dependence on social programs and improving the country's
competitiveness in the global economy.

One student added

to this discussion the idea that educated people were more
able to be innovative and to create jobs not only by
creating employment slots but by creating all together new
industries.
Other respondents mentioned other issues, racial
equality, for example, but there were no respondents who
did not reveal, here or elsewhere, a fundamental belief in
these liberal principles.

Recall Halpern's (1961)

discussion of myth; he points out that myths "bind together
social groups as wholes or, in other words, to establish a
social consensus"

(137).

If the participants in this

survey are indicative of American society on this point,
liberal ideas do bind social groups in this society
together.

The findings discussed above come from men and

women, rich and poor students, blacks and whites, and the
young and old.

There appears to be a consensus on these

values.
A second characteristic of myth is that it provides a
descriptive image of the world which is then used as a
foundation for evaluating what should be.

As Geertz has
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observed, myths "are felt somehow to sum up, for those whom
they are resonant, what is known about the way the world
is, the quality of the emotional life it supports, and the
way one ought to behave while in it"

(1973).

Or, in the

words of Eliade: "the foremost function of myth is to
reveal the exemplary model for all human rights and
significant activities- diet or marriage, work or
education, art or wisdom"

(1963, 8).

In expressing their

own priorities, the students revealed their perceptions of
what is important in life.

In expressing their views of

the presidential candidates, they revealed the process of
comparing the "is" to the "ought."

The nature of this

process of evaluation will be discussed in detail below;
but the importance of liberal ideals in making choices in
the political world is clear in the respondents'
evaluations of the presidential candidates:
(Perot) had some strong points; approaching government
with business sense
(Clinton won because) people sensed a state of
doldrums and they wanted quick change; get economy
revved up; there was a perception of recession and no
economic gain
the way I look at things is the way Bush looks at
things
(Perot's) business sense might could have helped
economic problems
(Clinton was interested in) jobs in this country
(republicans) cater to the upper classes
(Bush) untrustworthy about the economy; people could
see we were in a recession
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(voted for Bush because) economic issues superior to
Clinton
(Bush lost because) family values are nice, but we
live in a country with different individuals with
their own views of morality...making family values
center and economics a side issue is reversed
priorities
(Bush) held views that appeal to my generation;
government should not regulate too much;
(Clinton's) middle class tax cut was not legitimate
(liked Clinton because) he was from an economically
disadvantaged state just like Louisiana so he will
understand
republicans leaned more toward moral issues; democrats
more towards concrete issues (e.g.) women's issues
(liked Bush because) worry less about social programs
more about economic health of the country in terms of
business
As these examples indicate, the same themes which are
expressed in personal priorities are the principle ones
used to evaluate presidential candidates.

What is also

clear, however, is that in the process of moving from basic
beliefs to evaluations tremendous variation arises.
Personal autonomy and economic status were important to
all, but there was disagreement on what actions should be
taken to insure these values, and, therefore, on who is
more likely to take the correct actions.

This disagreement

arises in part because of variation in perceptions of
empirical circumstances, or what Halpern referred to as
situation (1961), to be discussed in part two of this
chapter.

The point to be made here, however, is that
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liberal ideals display the second characteristic of a myth:
they provide a standard for evaluation.
The third characteristic of myth which needs to be
discussed is the form in which these shared standards of
evaluation exist, i.e., narrative.

In most traditional

myths, the major character is a hero of some type, a moral
exemplar.
1963).

Often this hero possesses divine power (Eliade,

As Campbell describes it, the action in most all

myths is a guest which requires separation of the hero from
the community.

Upon successful completion of the quest

and the achievement of some knowledge or goal, the hero
returns to the community (Campbell 1968).

The story of the

hero is told within the community because the actions and
achievements of the hero are to become the ideals for human
behavior within the society.
If liberalism is a myth, its narrative certainly does
not fit into this traditional form.

The participants in

the survey did not discuss particular individuals who had
divine power.
return.

They did not tell stories of separation and

In fact, at the level of abstraction of the

liberal ideals which have been discussed in this chapter,
the respondents did not generally tell stories at all.

In

sum, it seems safe to conclude that the respondents did not
view their fundamental political beliefs as comprising a
myth.

If asked, most of them certainly would have denied

such a proposition.

A more accurate description of their
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own perceptions of their own beliefs may be "self-evident
truths."

The evidence for this interpretation is the

absence of alternatives in the belief systems of these
individuals.

They did not discus various possible

political ideals and settle on liberal ones; the liberal
ones seem to be unchallenged.

Consequently, they remain

largely implicit and are not expressed in a coherent
fashion.
It falls to the present analyst, therefore, to
demonstrate that there .is. a narrative form which underlies
the standards of evaluation discussed heretofore in this
chapter.

Such a demonstration requires looking for the

characters, character traits, and plot which integrate
liberalism into a solid foundation for evaluation of
political action.
Examining political beliefs through a story lens, it
appears that we are its only characters.

There is no

evidence in the survey responses of any belief in some
human beings who are qualitatively different from everyone
else; no discussion of "other" people whose lives are to be
accepted as standards of behavior.

Rather, most references

were to "people" generally, or to classes of American
citizens.

These are a few examples of such references in

political discussion:
if you choose not to that is your problem
blacks blame whites as a group
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children are harmed by...
people should have...
once people have jobs they will...
parents of white children...
most women...
our government is exactly what we deserve
...pull your own weight
my generation...
one man, one vote
These and many similar phrases indicate that when Americans
think about politics, they think in terms of Americans.
Beyond this observation, it is important to note that
these phrases can be placed into two categories.

The more

important at the level of myth consists of the ones which
refer to people universally.

Such expressions reveal the

belief that there are characteristics of all human beings.
This fact along with the absence of any discussion of
qualitative distinctions among people reveals a general
belief in human equality.

It constructing the foundational

liberal narrative, this is a very important point.

Unlike

previous myths, there is no evidence of morally exemplary
human beings to which everyone else is compared.

This does

not, however, imply that the vision of society which
Americans hold is without people.

We the people are

ourselves the characters of our own foundational narrative.

The next question to be examined involves the nature
of the characters in the story, in this case, American
citizens themselves.

The attribution literature reveals

that people do attribute characteristics to various groups
of people.

To be an element of a liberal myth, however, a

particular characteristic should be applied to most all
people.

The survey responses reveal that there is at least

one characteristic of human nature which is contained in
the liberal vision.

The importance of economic concerns to

the respondents has been discussed.

There is also some

indication, implicit in their comments, of a belief that
economic or property concerns are of fundamental importance
to all people, at least to all Americans.

Discussion of

economic issues dominated the interviews.

Economic

motivations were essential to the respondents'
understanding of politics.

Of particular importance to the

respondents was the freedom to acquire property.
Evaluations of social and political relationships focused
on whether they aided or interfered with this freedom.

The

examples given above reveal that for some, government
regulation is interfering with this freedom, and for
others, economic inequality and lack of education are the
primary problems.

For all of the respondents, however, the

desire to be free to achieve economic prosperity was seen
as an essential attribute of themselves and others and
should be the goal of government action.
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Beyond characters and their motivations, the most
defining element of narrative is action.

It would be

difficult to defend the position that liberalism is
accurately described as a myth if free and equal American
citizens who are driven by an interest in economic security
did not do anything.
In their responses to the survey questions, however,
participants expressed a great deal of action in their
political beliefs: having, wanting, regulating, blaming,
declining, increasing, teaching, changing, cutting,
spending, learning, etc.

The myth, however, requires an

abstract and universal action; a vision of what people (the
ideal citizens) do which can provide a basis for judging
what people (real citizens) do.

This action must be the

essential action of free human beings living as they are
intended to live.

In this way, liberalism would function

as a myth; it could provide a standard for judging how "one
ought to behave."
A clue as to what the plot of the liberal narrative
might be is provided by attribution of the character trait
discussed above.

If the ideal human being is a free and

equal individual driven by economic and property concerns;
it is reasonable to expect that the activities of these
individuals would be those aimed at achieving their
desires.

And in fact, the importance of work in the nature

of social reality was confirmed in the interviews.

As a
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rule, work was defined narrowly to mean employment which
leads directly to material rewards.

For many, however,

education was an important part of this activity.
Education functions to prepare one for employment in a
field in which material gains are possible.

Thus education

is similar to the work involved in employment except that
it is invested in future rewards rather than immediate
ones.
if your work hard and get an education you will live
and do fine
welfare would not be necessary if we could employ
Americans in American jobs
...education which leads to good jobs
I would rather spend a little money on creating jobs
than just give away money...(we need to) invest in
training and education
so much social spending leads to a decline of the work
ethic
Similar sentiments are echoed throughout the interviews.
They provide brief glimpses into the belief that work is an
essential activity of human beings.
The liberal story, then, is not one of heros and
quests and returns, but one of equal human beings, driven
by a desire to achieve some degree of material gain,
working to achieve this end.

Social and political

interactions are then evaluated in terms of whether they
promote or hinder this scenario.

If the lack of education

or government regulation interferes with this process,
change is demanded.

More evidence and a more complete
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description of this process will be presented in the second
part of this chapter.

For now, however, it does seem safe

to conclude that the prevalence of discussions of people in
general, economic matters, and the education/employment/
reward process is evidence of the narrative form of
liberalism.
The fourth and final characteristic of myth to be
discussed is its historical survival.

The most telling

evidence of this aspect of liberalism is the essential
similarity between the view of human beings and social
activity expressed by the participants in this survey and
that expressed by Locke.

The emphasis then and the

emphasis now is on individuals acquiring property as
opposed to an ideal of a social whole.

Some of the

economic conclusions drawn from these beliefs may have
changed over the centuries, but the core narrative has
survived in tact.
To this point, only one myth, liberalism has been
described.

The initial expectations, however, were that

the inclusion of religious and black respondents would
reveal the existence of other myths in American society.
This expectation is not supported by the evidence.

Many of

the quotations offered above as evidence of liberalism are
taken from black or religious respondents.

Certainly this

does not indicate that there are no other myths which are
important in our society.

Several of the black students,

135
for example, indicated that the ideal of equality has not
been accepted in the African-American community; a view of
racial inferiority remains common.

They explained how this

condition remains as a hinderance to social and economic
achievements by black Americans.

As one respondent

describes it, the stakes of challenging this view and
failing are very high; such failure would leave one
excluded from both worlds.
by black students at LSU.

But such beliefs are not held
The same is probably true of

religion; there may well be religious people who reject the
isolation and materialistic aspects of liberalism, but none
of these people were included in the sample for the present
survey.

Again, perhaps such people are not common in

institutions of higher education.

For most of the people

who did identify themselves as members of a religion,
Christianity in all cases, their religious views may have
had an impact on one or two issue positions, but did not
lead them to question the common liberal view of the
workings of American politics and society.
The discussion of the liberal narrative, however,
points out a peculiarity of this myth when compared with
other myths.

The narrative survives and functions without

what might be called "common substance."

In most myths the

gods and heros, the goals of the quests and the trials
therein, as well as the threats to the heros all have
common names.

The members of the society who know the myth
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know the names.

Liberalism, on the other hand, might be

described as a myth without names.

It is a more vacuous

form into which one places the names from personal
experience.

The hero may be Jack Kemp or Martin Luther

King, the villain may be bureaucracy or racism, the guest
may be prestige, power, or a fine home.

Though all myths

are stories related to real and empirical experience,
liberalism derives it substance and names from real and
personal experience.
The consequences of this peculiarity are several.

For

one the story may sound very different when told by
different people.

This makes it difficult for the analyst

to recognize unless he or she looks for it specifically.
This same transparency is true for people in general.

All

of the respondents recognize major problems in American
society.

Only one, and even this was only a slight hint,

indicated that these problems might be a consequence of
liberalism.

Liberalism, as a rule, is not questioned, and

it is not questioned, at least partially, because no one
knows it is there.

Ironically, this power of liberalism is

still further indication of its myth status despite this
vacuous or plastic quality.
At a more existential level as well, the peculiar
nature of liberalism gives it peculiar power.

In

traditional societies, the myth actively ties the
individual to other individuals.

Despite the commonality
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of liberalism in American belief systems, this myth
actively dis-integrates individuals from each other.
Personal success is dependent on personal effort.

Every

respondent recognizes that the rewards of success are
property and prestige, and the deserts of failure are
embarrassment and poverty; these are the only two
possibilities presented by the myth.

For young

respondents, therefore, tremendous time and energy are
channeled into stacking the deck in one's favor.

The

contemplation of alternative visions of society is not a
luxury they can afford.

Thus their proposals for change

call for increases in the purity of liberalism: welfare
reform, less government, government should be run more like
a business, etc.

Though the myth is certainly an important aspect, and
perhaps the most important aspect, of the political belief
system, most of the substance of political thought is
somewhat less abstract.

Though the elements of the liberal

story are evident in the thoughts of the respondents; a
great deal of mental effort invested in working out its
subtle details is not evident.
discussion,

There is very little

for example, of other human characteristics, or

of exactly how much and what type of work are best.
Neither, however, is there evidence to support the
proposition that political reasoning is dominated by policy
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details; the myriad of little decisions which are involved
in policy formulation on issues like the economy,
education, welfare, do not appear as elements of the
reasoning process.

And yet the respondents have very

definite opinions on issues such as the economy, education,
and welfare.
The purpose of this section is to explore the
reasoning process as it exists between these two extremes.
The main point to be made in this exploration is that the
narrative form/process is an essential element of this
middle-level political thinking.

More specifically, the

data from the interviews supports the idea of the heuristic
as it is described by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) .
Beyond simply reaffirming the importance of the heuristic,
however, the function of both empirical experience and myth
in the development of these stories can be portrayed.

The

information from the interviews reveals two common
heuristics: one which might be labeled a social welfare
heuristic and which is a somewhat more narrow variation of
the desert heuristic, and a family heuristic.

The chapter

will conclude with commentary on rational coherence and
mass belief systems.
Before presenting the two specific heuristics, the
general process of heuristic formation should be specified.
Heuristics appear to be the product of both real world
experience and a myth, and the process is probably circular
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in a chicken and egg fashion.

The discussion of it here

begins arbitrarily with observations of the real world.
Such observations may be derived from a person's own
experience or from information learned from others.

The

two examples to be discussed focus on the individual
respondent's own experience.

They comprise what might be

referred to as the "facts" of the belief system.

In some

instances, respondents cited such facts as evidence in
support of their opinions.
direct.

This link, however, is not so

Facts in and of themselves are extremely

incomplete and inadequate to producing a complete picture
of the world or politics.
an interpretive framework.
the myth.

Conclusions, therefore, require
The framework is supplied by

The heuristics which result are a consolidation

of certain bits of information into clusters which are more
narrow in scope than and subservient to the myth.

The

narrative form of these clusters is to be expected for
reasons of integration and simplification as described in
chapter three.

These subnarratives are the principle

components of normal, everyday, political evaluation.
The two examples of heuristic taken from the data
collected in the interviews reveal the characteristics of
the heuristic.

Both of them indicate the importance of the

liberal myth, the importance of experience, and the
utilization of the heuristic in political evaluation.
There is also evidence, though the data is very limited, to
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support the idea that the elements of the heuristic are
people and actions rather than abstract principles, thus
supporting the idea of narrative form.
On social welfare issues, there are two general points
of view.

The first is nearly universal opposition to

social welfare programs of the government.

This position

can be seen as a consequence of liberalism and experience.
Generally speaking, this opposition was expressed most
adamantly by a subset of respondents whose life experiences
have been those of the upper-middle class; that is,

the

group of people with almost no direct experience with such
programs.

As a rule the head of the household, usually

their fathers, were doctors, executives, or other
successful professionals.

Despite this absence of

experience, these respondents viewed these programs not
only very negatively, but as very important factors in
American politics.

They commented that such programs

destroyed "dignity," "the family;" and the "work ethic."
They were fearful of the threat such programs were to their
vision of their way of life.
representative:

This comment is

"my age group is at risk; providing for the

sick [AIDS patients], the old [increasing life expectancy],
and the young [high birth rates among the poor]; how can it
be done."
Such comments reveal not only the liberal myth but the
respondents' own experience of "self sufficiency" which is
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generalized to all

people:

education you will

do fine; if you choose not

your problem."

the language of

In

11if you work hard and get an
to, that's

the desertheuristic,

these respondents believe thatneed must be a

product of

one's own choices, and consequently oppose responses by the
government to this need.
Consider more closely the belief that government
programs destroy "dignity."

This conclusion may well be

based on observations of the absence of dignity among those
who benefit from such programs.

Very telling, however, is

the direction of the causal relationship in this story:
payments destroy dignity.

Why is the need for payments not

explained as a result of the loss of dignity?

An observed

correlation between government support and personal dignity
can be explained either way.

The preference for the former

is clearly a product of the liberal myth.

The latter

interpretation would require some recognition of systematic
or structural factors which destroy dignity before the
government gets involved.

A liberal vision of society

hinders the recognition of such factors.

And the life

experiences of this group of respondents confirm the
importance of personal responsibility.

To generalize from

these observations; information, in this case the
experience of economic independence, is received into a
liberal interpretive framework, and a heuristic of
government created dependency becomes the standard for
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judging welfare programs.

The major elements of the

heuristic discussed above are present: experience is
interpreted within a myth which results in a description of
social interaction, a story, which then becomes a standard
for the evaluation of a set of policies.
Turning to the other major variation of the social
welfare heuristic, respondents of lower socio-economic
status, some of whom had personal experience with welfare
programs, often recognized systematic or structural
variables which contributed to the need for government aid.
As mentioned, black respondents recognized that AfricanAmerican society has not generally adopted the liberal
myth.

To the extent that these respondents recognized

external causes of economic inequality and supported
programs to overcome the disparities, they confirm the
importance of the desert heuristic.

The richness of the

data from the interviews, however, reveals a more important
distinction between the two groups.

In addition to

recognizing the need for welfare programs, the respondents
with experience with such programs also recognized the
problems with and limitations of them.

Generally, these

respondents did not see government payments as a long term
or permanent solutions.

Rather they, whether white or

black, saw education at the heart of the problem and the
solution.

The cause of social inequality, however, was not

the liberal vision of education described above, but
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systematic discrimination, particularly of blacks, out of
this opportunity.

The response of one white, future

educator is representative,

"In our system of education of

the past twenty or thirty years, blacks have been
systematically short changed."
this process in detail:

Black respondents describe

"(in the schools I went to) blacks

were placed in the lower sections where teachers were not
teaching; this starts in kindergarten; one or two blacks
are placed in the upper sections; all of the rest are moved
to the side."

The proposed solution in all of these cases

was not a different kind of education, but greater
inclusion of blacks within the system.

Thus liberalism is

again evident as the interpretive framework of information.
The information is different for the two groups, but the
standards of judgment to which reality is compared are
developed from the same core narrative.
A second heuristic which is evident in the interviews
portrays the role of the family in an otherwise individual
oriented society.

Most responses to questions about family

values can be placed into one of two categories.

Many

respondents felt that this was an extremely important
issue: "the degeneration of the family is the number one
problem in America."

This importance derives from a family

heuristic which functions as a subnarrative of the liberal
myth.

In this heuristic, the family is the focal point of

personal relationship and responsibility; it is an

exception to purely individualistic liberal autonomy.
these people,

For

"traditional values of right and wrong" are

dependent on "normal" family life.

In this scenario,

society can function as long as the family remains the
"corner stone of the nation," and children learn
traditional values of "hard work and pulling your own
wait," or "if your honest with yourself you can be positive
in your achievements."

The break down of this source of

values leads to "irresponsibility," "teenage pregnancy,"
"welfare," i.e., the liberal ideal is threatened:

"(family

values means) originally people to act in a Christian
manner; stay married; politically exploited to mean family
leave which is not legitimate;

...very important; morality

of country is very important; teen age pregnancy comes back
to morality which causes economic policy."

Ironically,

while the traditional family and its values are seen as
essential to our survival, these respondents did not see
that the larger society or its government had any role to
play in its maintenance: "degeneration of the family is
number one problem in American; don't know how politicians
can change this; it begins in the home." "Parents teach
(family values); cannot be legislated."

This fact is

further indication that a perception of the importance of
family values is consistent with the general liberal myth.
Most respondents could be placed in this first
category of responses to the family values question.

A
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small group of interviewees, however, are clearly distinct.
For these individuals, the issue was purely a political
creation.

(A couple of respondents fall somewhere in

between these two extremes.)

In two cases, the concept of

traditional values, to say nothing of family, had been
abandoned all together.

For one self described

libertarian, family values was a "smoke-screen" and
"stupid."

For another it was an effort to galvanize

support of suburban whites with normal families against
inner-city blacks without.

Both of these respondents were

very concerned that the economic and political spheres be
left alone to operate freely.
Both of these general responses to the issue of
families are consistent with the liberal myth.

One

variation depicts families and the values they teach as
essential elements of a properly functioning liberal
society; the other portrays such values as a hinderance to
the same goal.

The limited evidence also supports the

suggested importance of personal experience in the
development of the heuristic.

All of the respondents in

the first group grew up in very strong, usually religious,
families.

Those in the second group did not have this

experience.

The description thus far of the policy evaluation process
seems to indicate that there may be no relationship between
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a particular myth and particular policy conclusions.

In

the examples presented here, the same core narrative
provides the foundation for contradictory conclusions.

One

might be tempted to conclude from this discussion that the
myth on which the mass belief system is built has no policy
consequences.

As described above, policy opinions can be

seen as consistent with the individual system history, but
liberalism may lead to any number of policy positions on
any given issue.

To reach such a conclusion, however, is

to fail to recognize liberalism for what it is: a shared
myth which provides the interpretive framework not only for
respondents but for analysts as well.

A somewhat more

objective view makes a different conclusion possible.
Rather than concluding that liberalism has no policy
consequences, I would argue that liberalism is directly
related to the policy questions.

Answers to the questions

may vary greatly, but the questions themselves arise from
limitations of the myth.

To illustrate this point,

consider a few political questions which do not arise in
the United States: Should there be a maximum limit on the
amount of property one can posses?

Should wealthy people

who do not use their wealth responsibly have it taken away?
Should church attendance be required?
States exist as a nation?

Should the United

These questions are such

profound violations of the liberal myth that they are non
issues in our society.

In other times and places, however,
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they could be, have been, and are the focus of intense
political debate.

It is also clear that in another time

and place, with a different myth structure, abortion might
never be considered, or the need to politically enforce a
minimum standard of living never arise.
This conclusion is consistent with the theory
presented in previous chapters.

We know that any myth

functions to simplify and make manageable the "absolutism
of reality."

It makes sense, then, that there would be

limits to the experience which is encompassed by any
individual myth.

In other words, the explanatory power is

limited and breaks down on certain questions.

These may be

the questions which politics in a society struggles to
answer.

Consider the abortion issue in our society.

origin of life is not described by the myth.

The

From this

perspective, it is not a surprise that this has become such
a politically volatile issue and requires a purely
political answer.

The interviews I have conducted reveal two striking
characteristics of the respondents: their sameness and
their uniqueness.

For all of them, liberalism is the

interpretive basis for translating their experience into
heuristics; the process and its substantive foundation are
the same.

However, owing to tremendous variations in

information and experience, political evaluations vary

greatly.

Even people who come to the same conclusions may

do so for different reasons.

This situation is exactly

that of self-organized systems: complexity generated by
identical processes but produced by sensitivity to initial
conditions and system history.

Recall the observations of

Krohn, Kuppers, and Nowotny (1990).

"Complexity is

recognized as a genuine phenomena that does not lend itself
to being reduced to something simple or being explained by
the 'overlapping' of simple elements (6).

And,

"irregularity of nature is not treated as an anomaly but
becomes the focus of research and thus is declared to be
normal.

One looks for regularity within irregularity.

Non-equilibrium processes are recognized as the source of
order and the search for equilibrium is replaced by the
dynamics of processes"

(7).

Approaching belief systems from a narrative
perspective has resulted in a recognition of rational
coherence within the individual belief system.

This

coherence is not horizontal constraint between issues as
has been expected in earlier studies, but historical
constraint.

Political beliefs are consistent with

experience interpreted within a historical narrative.

The

existence of a sort of mass belief system is also apparent.
Again it is different from earlier expectations, but the
predominance of the liberal myth and its importance in
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generating the questions faced by our society would suggest
that it is a foundation of a mass belief system.
The fundamental weakness of this analysis is an
absence of variation at the level of myth between
respondents and between respondents and the analyst.
Future research should try to overcome this limitation by
using comparative analysis.
across time and place.

Comparisons must be made

Such comparisons would help the

analyst achieve some perspective on his or her own "mode of
being in the world."
The data is also limited by the survey technique which
was employed.

Inquiring into the respondents views on a

set list of issues interferes with the normal political
reasoning process.

This is an important limitation when

the object of interest is the reasoning process itself.

It

is possible that fewer and more general questions would
allow respondents to reveal in detail the narrative form of
their reasoning and more richness in the heuristic.

CONCLUSION

If there is one central element which this
dissertation adds to the belief system literature, it is a
recognition of the importance of plot in political
reasoning.

Previous research had identified numerous

important elements of the political evaluation process:
persons, social groups, personal attributes, ideologies,
memories.

The connections between these elements, however,

had remained so obscure that Bennett (1977) concluded that
this body of research was in need of some rather radical
rethinking.

The incorporation of action, however, into an

understanding of political reasoning creates a more
congealed picture of this process.
The initial argument that plot may be an important
element of political reasoning was based on the importance
of social interaction in the heuristics described by
Sniderman and his colleagues (1990).

The form of these

heuristics can be described as narrative.

When combined

with the findings of others that belief systems are
hierarchical in structure, the possibility that plot is
also an important element of reasoning at more abstract
levels was suggested.

As an initial examination of this

thesis, the theoretical links between notions of myth and
belief system were explored in chapter two.
similarities were discovered.
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Substantial

For example, myths are
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described as providing the image of reality which is used
in evaluations of reality, and it is just such evaluations
which are the basis of the individual political opinions
which comprise the belief system.
The subsequent chapter approached the belief system
literature form a different tack.

Whereas the primary

interest of chapter two was the nature of beliefs, chapter
three questioned the nature of the system.

Observations

about belief systems were compared to general expectations
of self-organized systems.

Collectively, these

observations provided substantial justification for
conceptualizing belief systems as self-organized.

For

example, previous research has demonstrated both the
importance of history in one's political opinions and the
vast degree of irregularity
belief systems.

which exists between people's

These are both characteristics of self

organized systems as they have been described in other
fields.

This reconceptualization makes a shift in the

focus of research efforts necessary.

Efforts to understand

self-organized systems are not directed toward making
predictions about system response to the environment but on
understanding the processes which enable it to maintain its
organization and respond to challenges from the
environment.
Again proceeding via a comparison of concepts, chapter
three argued that a complex of processes related to the
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narrative form may be the organizational principle of self
organized belief systems.

The observation was made, for

example, that stories are generally rationally coherent in
that events can be seen as following from previous events,
but they are not logically deterministic because any single
event is not the only possible and necessary consequence of
any previous one.

This point demonstrates the conceptual

compatibility of narrative and self-organization.

Beyond

this, it was also noted that political evaluation requires
some cognitive process of simplification and that stories
may well serve this purpose.

Thus there is also reason to

expect that stories are central elements of opinion
formation.
At issue in chapter four was the importance of plot as
it relates to previous theories of belief systems.

Here

the scope of the theory of myth based, self-organized
belief systems was demonstrated.

The indications were that

it is not just another theory thrown into the quagmire of
belief system literature (Bennett 1977; Kuklinski, Luskin,
and Bolland 1991), but neither does it supplant previous
theories.

Rather just as myths integrate individual

beliefs into a system and individual persons into a
society, so does the theory of myth based belief systems
integrate previous theories.

For example, adding plot to

the concept of schema provides a better understanding of
the integration and evolution of schema.
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The exploration of concepts which was the focus of the
dissertation through these first chapters resulted in a
theory of belief systems with several strengths.

One of

the strengths of the theory of myth based belief systems is
its parsimony.

No longer is there a need to provide

different explanatory schemes for different people.

Though

individuals do posses different degrees of information and
intelligence, the underlying organizational process of the
belief system is expected to be the same for everyone.

A

construct like "levels of conceptualization" does not
indicate a qualitative difference in the nature of these
processes as even the most sophisticated citizen does not
approach full comprehension of the political universe.
Everyone must organize pieces of knowledge into some whole;
narratives make this possible regardless of intelligence or
knowledge.

Furthermore, the myth based theory of systems

of belief is appropriate to all political questions.

No

longer is a theory of social group attachment required to
explain racial policy, and a theory of religious values to
explain positions on moral issues, and a theory of schema
to explain the importance of memory in deciphering
experience.
Despite the parsimony and power of the theory, this
dissertation would have been incomplete without some
exploration of these concepts as they are manifest in real
people.

Chapters five and six added this exploration.

In
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general, the theory was supported by the data collected in
the interviews, though some alteration was necessary.
Among the most important conclusions from this
investigation were:
The importance of the heuristic in the reasoning
process is affirmed.

As a rule this is the level of

abstraction at which most political thinking occurs.
are general perceptions of social interaction.

These

They are

more abstract than thoughts about individuals and policy
details, but they are somewhat less abstract than an
underlying•vision of the fundamental nature of human
motivations and actions.

Though the heuristic is distinct

from these two levels, both are essential to its nature.

A

general heuristic may well be grounded in some specific
details which provide evidence of its veracity, and these
details are interpreted in the context of an underlying
vision of the fundamental nature of human motivations and
actions.
In reaching this conclusion, the dissertation has come
full circle.

The heuristic as set out in some of the most

recent literature on belief systems was the point of
departure for the suggestion that narrative may be an
important aspect of political cognition.

Then its

importance was confirmed by both its theoretical
implications, as have been explored here, and the data from
the interviews.

A second conclusion consistent with both the theory
and the data is that liberalism is accurately conceived of
as a myth.

In origin, form, process, and psychological and

sociological function, liberalism meets the criteria set
forth by most mythologists.

It is true that the American

myth is in some ways non-traditional.

Its "nuclear unit,"

autonomous individual - initiation/work - reward, is quite
different from the "nuclear unit of the monomyth,"
separation - initiation - return, described by Campbell
(1968, 30-38).

It is also the case that the autonomous

individual remains a rather generic and nameless form.
Nevertheless, liberalism is essentially a narrative which
provides a simplified but coherent vision of human
interaction which works as a foundation for interpretation
of information and experience, and which by describing
reality necessarily also describes deviance from reality
and thereby functions as the source of prescriptions.
The fundamental importance of this myth, and the
narrative form/process, within the individual belief system
is also clear in the interviews.

It is the primary goal of

belief system research to explain rational coherence.

The

standard of rational coherence for the respondents is
consistency with experience as interpreted within the
liberal core narrative.

Thus rational integration of the

whole is far more dependent on personal history than on
environmental sources of rational relationships.
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In addition the theory extends beyond the individual.
When properly understood, it is. meaningful to speak of a
mass belief system.

The mistake in the past has been to

focus on patterns of policy positions as manifestations of
such a phenomenon.

The theory and the evidence presented

here, however, suggest that a mass belief system lies below
a policy opinion surface.

In fact, the pervasiveness of

liberalism indicates that it should certainly be conceived
of as the foundation of a mass belief system.

We have also

seen that this foundation, though it does not lead to
shared patterns of opinion, is directly responsible for the
political questions with which our society must deal.

Thus

the mass belief system, unified by the liberal myth in this
case, is the source of American politics; it is the source
of the questions which must be answered politically.
As mentioned in the introduction, however, the theory
leaves us with a host of fundamental research questions.
Among these are the following.
Traditionally, public opinion research has made
extensive use of statistical analytical techniques.

Such

methods are easily applied to close-ended survey responses.
For a couple of reasons, however, such analysis is now
expected to be problematic.

Policy opinions, according to

the theory proposed, are susceptible to numerous,
interactive influences and therefore cannot be used as
indications of deeper beliefs.

As discussed in chapter
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four, an understanding of the context of an opinion is a
necessary part of understanding the opinion itself.
Questions like "what is at stake?" must be asked.

In

addition, such opinions are expected to be wildly
irregular; indeed, chaotic.

Techniques used in examination

of other self-organized systems hold promise for belief
system research, but issues of how best to apply them are
also numerous.
As a beginning point for discussion on empirical
issues surrounding the belief system described in this
dissertation, the following might be considered.
might focus on one or two issues.

Surveys

Instead of a single

indicator on an issue, however, a question cluster might be
developed.

These questions would be aimed at providing

context for the beliefs of interest.

Such question

clusters might include inquiries relating to various
potential costs and benefits associated with issue
alternatives.

"An increase in income taxes leads to which

of the following: better social services, greater equality
in society, a worsened economy, more government waste, hard
times for the middle class, more money available for
scientific research, etc?"

With enough forethought and

perhaps pilot studies, clusters of valid, close-ended
question might be possible.

This would maintain the

advantages of mass surveys but also provide richer data for
deciphering the reasoning process.

In addition to belief
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context, such question clusters could include experiential
questions which are known to be important on the particular
issue.

If such data were collected over time, self-

organizational statistical techniques could then be applied
to the inter-relationships between the various indicators
in the clusters.

In this way the nature of challenge and

response of systems of political belief in the environment
could be described mathematically.
In addition to considering context and time factors in
data collection, comparative analysis is also necessary in
developing an understanding of the foundations of mass
belief systems.

Certainly no analyst will ever completely

escape the influence his or her own myth has on perceptions
of the world.

However, comparative analysis may make

elements of one myth more evident by placing them in
contrast to another.
Other information, besides survey data, may also
reveal aspects of the American political narrative web.
For example, issue evolution can be tracked through
campaign rhetoric or legislative policy votes.

Such

analysis may reveal that issues arise at the points where a
myth fails to provide answers, or that changes in the
issues being discussed are related to changes in the
foundation of the mass belief system.
As they stand here, all of the elements of the
proposed theory are in need of a great deal more
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exploration and explication.

What variations exist in the

basic liberal myth in American public opinion?

Do some

types of experiences have greater influence on belief
systems than other types?

What factors influence rigidity

and flexibility of the myth and other narratives?

What

impact do information and cognitive ability have on the
belief system?
asked.

These and many other basic questions can be

They indicate that the theory of myth based belief

systems remains a rough sketch.

The interviews which were

conducted filled in a few details, but the theory itself
needs to be recognized as merely a single step in a process
of clarification and discovery.
More generally, the theory raises questions about the
nature of democratic politics.

Surely the human equality

element of liberalism has contributed greatly to the
advance of democratic theory and practice.

As noted in the

analysis of the interviews, however, this common foundation
for the political beliefs of Americans seems to be directly
related to our most divisive disagreements.

Furthermore,

these disagreements are often unresolvable exactly because
they are divergent conclusions stemming from the same myth.
In such a situation, democracy becomes simply a political
mechanism for reaching a decision.

The majority has its

way and potentially substantial minorities are left with no
recourse.

If democracy is to incorporate a philosophy in

which all persons are seen as equal parts of something
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larger and whole, it must provide for working toward
consensus.
One alternative would be to attempt to fashion a new
myth which would provide a better foundation for democracy.
Another possibility, and perhaps a more realistic one, is
simply to recognize the myth qualities of liberalism.

For

the participants in the survey, liberal ideas seem to exist
in the belief system as unquestioned assumptions.
Respondents did not express a preference for this core
narrative over others; they did not seem to recognize any
others.

As such, it was removed from debate.

It was

unquestioned, unchallenged, as therefore, rigid.

This is

perhaps an historical consequence of a fundamental belief
in the value of democracy; as democracy is held in such
high esteem, its foundations are held fixed.

But it is

this sacred and abstracted status of liberalism that leaves
the nation unable to resolve fundamental political
questions.

In turn this produces the tremendously low

feelings of efficacy which are evident in the respondents'
discussions of democracy in America.

The refusal to

question liberalism may be detrimental to democracy.
By contrast, the recognition that liberalism is a myth
leads to the realization that it is one story among many
(Halpern 1961) .

Furthermore, its limitations are realized.

As a myth, liberalism is incomplete; it is an effort to
deal with a reality that cannot fully be comprehended

(Blumenburg 1985).

In its limitations, it is not relevant

to or capable of providing answers to every political
question.

Consequently, if democracy is important, it

requires not an unwillingness to question its philosophical
and myth foundations, but a willingness to explore those
foundations to discover their strengths and weaknesses.
Only this way can the myth respond to challenge and thereby
evolve.

Such evolution is essential to the survival of any

myth (Blumenburg 1985; Campbell 1968) and may well be
essential to the survival of democracy.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the theory of
myth based belief systems is itself very much like a myth
as described above.

It provides an image of political

reasoning which is internally coherent but incomplete.

It

can guide our search for and examination of facts, but is
itself a way of looking at the facts.

As such, it should

not be considered a fixed entity, but a form/process.
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APPENDIX A
BELIEF SYSTEM QUESTIONNAIRE

I. The Presidential Candidates
A. Did you vote in the presidential election in November of
1992?
If NOT:

Why not?

If YES: for whom?
B. Why did you vote for ____________ ?
C. What were your impressions of the other candidates?
D Why do you think Clinton won the election?
OR Did Bush loose the election?

II. Issues
A. I would like you now to take just a moment and imagine
that you have been elected President of the United States:
1. What would be your top priority as president?
2. What do you think is the cause of this problem?
3. What would you do to solve it?
B. Other policy concerns you would have as President?
**I would like to ask you also about some other problems
and issues which some Americans are concerned with**
C. Why do you think black Americans are generally worse off
than white Americans?
D. In the last election, we heard quite a bit of discussion
about family values.
What do you think that means?
How important is this to your own political beliefs?
What are the threats to these values in our society?
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E. Do you think women inour country should play the same
roles as men or do the genders have different aspirations
and responsibilities?
F. Do you believe that everyone should be guaranteed a
minimum standard of living?
G. What is your position on the abortion issue?
H. What is your position on the death penalty?
I. Any other issues which you feel strongly about which we
have not yet discussed?
III. Government
A. Do you think the American Government is Democratic?
1. What does that mean to you?
B. Are some people's views better represented in our
government than others?

IV. Personal
A. I would like you to give me a narrative account of your
family history beginning with your grandparents and leading
up to how you came to be a student at L.S.U.
B. What are your career plans?
Do you see any social obstacles to achieving your
goals?
How will you overcome these?
C. Do you consider yourself a religious person?
Can you tell me about your participation and how your
religion influences your political beliefs?
D. Are you between the ages of 18 and 25?
Race?
Gender?
**Thank you!

APPENDIX B
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
I am conducting this interview as part of my research
for a Ph.D. in political science.

My interest is in a

general view of the relationship between political opinions
and social experiences.
As I am interested in your political opinions
generally, any one question is not that important.

Just

let me know if there is a question that you do not wish to
answer for any reason.

No explanation will be necessary,

though if you find a question unfair or biased in any way,
I would like to know that.
I would also like to assure you that responses to the
following questions will be completely confidential.

When

the interview is complete, your comments will be typed up
without any reference to you personally.
Please do not feel constrained by the questions;
simply discuss anything that comes in to your mind as you
hear the question and are answering it.

Also if you would

like to take a moment to think about your response, feel
free to do so.
Finally, some questions may sound repetitive; this is
because I do not know how you are going to respond and not
because I am trying to get you to respond a particular way.
Do not feel that you need to make up new answers if you
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have already explained your position.
questions?

Do you have any

APPENDIX C
EXPERIMENT CONSENT FORM

My signature on this form indicates that I have volunteered
to participate in this experiment on political beliefs,
conducted by Bryan Vincent on this ____ day of
, 1993.
I understand that all subjects in this project are
volunteers, and that I can choose not to continue or
participate at any point; that I have been informed as to
the nature of this experiment; and that the information I
provide will be anonymous and my identity will not be
revealed.
I also understand that the information I provide
will be used for no other purposes beyond those explained
to me today. Finally I reserve the right to ask any
questions at any time during the experiment.
Subjects Signature
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*
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literature.
I am currently employed by the Louisiana House of
Representatives which I hope is an interim position until a
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capital is staff analyst for the Health and Welfare and the
Municipal, Parochial and Cultural Affairs Committees.
Outside of the professional arena, I am committed to,
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Joseph's Cathedral Parish.
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